The efficiency wage model (EWM) has been advanced as an explanation for large and persistent wage differentials. The shirking version of the EWM assumes a trade-off between self-supervision and external supervision. The turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the firm. Variation across firms in the cost of monitoring/shirking or turnover then is hypothesized to account for wage variations across firms for homogeneous workers. Using a new sample of firm data, this paper presents empirical evidence of the trade-off of wage premiums for supervisory intensity and turnover. Little evidence is found to support either version of the EWM.

Recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations, yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. In this paper, a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977.

Our paper simulates the likely effects of a comparable-worth wage-adjustment policy in the state and local sector on female employment in the sector. The simulation is based on estimates of within-occupation male/female substitution and across-occupation occupational employment substitution that we obtain using data from the 1980 Census of Population.

This paper examines the effect of earnings taxes on wage variability over time. We estimate a "hedonic wage locus," which indicates how the market allows individuals to substitute the mean level of the wage for its variability across jobs. Information from this locus is used to estimate the parameters of individuals' indifference curves between the mean and temporal variation of hourly wages. On the basis of these utility-function parameters, we predict that lowering the rate of taxation on earnings would on average lead workers to choose jobs with slightly lower pretax mean wages and with less pretax wage variation.