Empirical models of local government unionization reveal substantial reductions in union membership due to right-to-work laws. Free riders, rather than underlying antiunion sentiments, are probably responsible because the unionization models include better measures of sentiments than right-to-work laws. Furthermore, these laws reduce the probability that bargaining unions form by more than they reduce the probability that nonbargaining associations form in three of five local government functions. These results also confirm the importance of free riders because union security clauses that prohibit free riders in states without right-to-work laws exist only in collective-bargaining contracts.

We specify a model of municipal labor demand when resource flows available to the municipality are uncertain. The model allows us to test the hypothesis that employment decisions are rational in the sense that they incorporate all available information at the time that the decisions are made. We find that, for our sample of communities, on the whole one cannot reject the hypothesis that labor demand is consistent with intertemporal utility maximization under uncertainty. However, small and large communities exhibit different behavior. The employment decisions of small communities are consistent with the model, while those of large communities are not.