This research examines the determinants of the match between high school seniors and postsecondary institutions in the United States. I model college application decisions as a nonsequential search problem and specify a unified structural model of college application, admission, and matriculation decisions that are all functions of unobservable individual heterogeneity. The results indicate that black and Hispanic representation at all 4‐year colleges is predicted to decline modestly—by 2%—if race‐neutral college admissions policies are mandated nationwide. However, race‐neutral admissions are predicted to decrease minority representation at the most selective 4‐year institutions by 10%.

Recent theoretical and empirical advances have renewed interest in monopsonistic models of the labor market. However, there is little direct empirical support for these models. We use an exogenous change in wages at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals as a natural experiment to investigate the extent of monopsony in the nurse labor market. We estimate that labor supply to individual hospitals is quite inelastic, with short‐run elasticity around 0.1. We also find that non‐VA hospitals responded to the VA wage change by changing their own wages.