This study is concerned with the impact of changes in economic conditions on the family. "Three issues are considered in this paper. First, the reasons why the family is not fading away as an economic entity are discussed. The argument of this paper is that, despite the declines in various economic functions of the family and the increases in divorces and in other failures, the survival capacity of the family is both strong and robust." Second, the author contends that the economic approach should be extended to deal with the effects of the life-span revolution, shifts in prices and incomes, and the ability of the family to cope with these changes. Third, the hypothesis is put forward that intergenerational transfers are less important than increases over time in real per capita incomes and changes in income composition, its permanent and temporary components, and the sources of income. The geographical focus is worldwide.

Whereas previous analyses of criminal deterrence have focused on the effect of criminal enforcement on crime rates, this study analyzes the existence of compensating differentials for criminal pursuits. By analyzing the risk-rewards trade-off, this approach represents a more comprehensive test of the criminal deterrence hypothesis. The sample consisted of black inner-city youths who reported their crime participation, crime income, and self-assessed risks from crime. The risk premiums for the three principal adverse outcomes (arrest, conviction, and prison) constituted between one-half and two-thirds of all crime income on the average, providing strong support for the criminal deterrence hypothesis.

The traditional model of collective bargaining confines unions to settlements constrained by the employer's labor demand curve, but an alternative model places wage-employment outcomes on a contract curve that extends beyond the labor demand curve. This paper derives a multidimensional (hedonic) contract-curve model in which employment-security provisions are used to maintain efficient bargains outside the employer's demand curve and distinguishes empirically between the contract-curve and demand-constraint models using data for public school teachers in New York State. Estimates clearly support the contract-curve model over the demand-constraint model by linking the gap between compensation and the value of the marginal product to the strength of employment-security provisions.