France’s 1998 implementation of the 35‐hour workweek has been one of the greatest regulatory shocks on labor markets. Few studies evaluate the impact of this regulation because of a lack of identification strategies. For historical reasons due to the way Alsace‐Moselle was returned to France in 1918, the implementation of France’s 35‐hour workweek was less stringent in that region than in the rest of the country, which is confirmed by double and triple differences. Yet it shows no significant difference in employment with the rest of France, which casts doubt on the effectiveness of this regulation

We study how firms’ personnel practices react to labor market regulation. While a company is compelled to comply with a new law, what is the ripple effect of the change on existing personnel policies and practices? We provide evidence using passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and nearly two decades of administrative data from a large US firm. In line with theory, we find a weakening of long-term implicit incentives and movement toward pay for performance. Furthermore, the data are consistent with the firm carefully managing its personnel practices according to economic principles to preserve incentives for employees

I assess the long‐run implications for children of growing up in a unilateral divorce environment, which increases the ease of divorce by not requiring the explicit consent of both partners. Using 40 years of census data to exploit the variation across states and over time in changes in divorce regulation, I confirm that unilateral divorce regulations do significantly increase the incidence of divorce. Adults who were exposed to unilateral divorce regulations as children are less well educated, have lower family incomes, marry earlier but separate more often, and have higher odds of adult suicide

Leisure externalities across households have important implications for labor market regulations but have proven very difficult to identify. This paper exploits the unique features of school holidays and paid leave regulations in France to show that exogenous increases in the amount of leisure time enjoyed by workers living with children induce very significant increases in the demand for leisure of workers living in other households. We also provide evidence that these cross effects are driven by complementarities in nonmarket time rather than workplace norms or workplace externalities

We study a model in which corporate social responsibility arises in response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may not be socially optimal. Companies can hire socially responsible employees who enjoy correcting spillovers. Because firms can capture rents created by allowing this, they sometimes find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then encourage socially responsible behavior in their midst. Thus, social responsibility can either increase or decrease social welfare, depending on the costs of political capture

This article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high-wage (good) and low-wage (bad) jobs coexist. Minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low-wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

Ecuadorian labor costs are said to be high because of the existence of many mandated benefits. Using the 1994 Living Standards Measurement Survey, we show that the effect of these benefits is actually mitigated by a reduction of base earnings, that is, of the foundation on which they are paid. The reduction is larger in the private than in the public sector and is negligible for unionized workers. We also show that, in spite of mandated benefits, interindustry wage differentials are comparable to those of Bolivia, a country characterized by “flexible” labor markets but otherwise similar to Ecuador.

This study explores corporate responses to 1993 legislation that capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management compensation not qualified as “performance‐based.” Our analysis suggests that the cap may have created a focal point for salary compensation but had little effect on total compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be affected by the limit. There is little evidence that the policy significantly increased the performance sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay at affected firms. We conclude that corporate pay decisions have been relatively insulated from this policy intervention.

We investigate how demand conditions affect employers’ provision of safety—something about which theory is ambivalent. Positive demand shocks relax financial constraints that limit safety investment but simultaneously raise the opportunity cost of increasing safety rather than production. We study the US metals mining sector, leveraging exogenous demand shocks from short-term variation in global commodity prices. We find that positive price shocks substantially increase workplace injury rates and safety regulation noncompliance. While these results indicate the general dominance of the opportunity cost effect, shocks that only increase mines’ cash flow lower injury rates, illustrating that financial constraints also affect safety