Drawing from conservation-of-resources theory, we examine a trickle-down model of differentiated transformational leadership (leaders treating followers differently) across three hierarchical levels (i.e., managers, supervisors, and supervisors’ followers). Specifically, we develop a model in which manager differentiated transformational leadership increases department unit stress (i.e., the managers’ group of followers), which then translates into increased differentiated supervisor transformational leadership. The latter then again positively predicts team unit stress (i.e., the supervisors’ group of followers) and, eventually, results in decreased team helping behavior of supervisors’ followers. We tested this model using data from a large, multisource field study. The results provide support for our trickle-down model in that department managers’ differentiated transformational leadership decreased team helping behavior two hierarchical levels below the manager via increasing department unit stress (Stage 1 mediator), supervisor differentiated transformational leadership (Stage 2 mediator), and team unit stress (Stage 3 mediator).

The sharing economy is estimated to add hundreds of billions of dollars to the global economy and is rapidly growing. However, trust-based commercial sharing—the participation in for-profit peer-to-peer sharing-economy activity—has negative as well as positive consequences for both the interacting parties and uninvolved third parties. To share responsibly, one needs to be aware of the various consequences of sharing. We provide a comprehensive, preregistered, systematic literature review of the consequences of trust-based commercial sharing, identifying 93 empirical papers spanning regions, sectors, and scientific disciplines. Via in-depth coding of the empirical work, we provide an authoritative overview of the economic, social, and psychological consequences of trust-based commercial sharing for involved parties, including service providers, users, and third parties. Based on the aggregate insights, we identify the common denominators for the positive and negative consequences. Whereas a well-functioning infrastructure of payment, insurance, and communication enables the positive consequences, ambiguity about rules, roles, and regulations causes non-negligible negative consequences. To overcome these negative consequences and promote more responsible forms of sharing, we propose the transparency-based sharing framework. Based on the framework, we outline an agenda for future research and discuss emerging managerial implications that arise when trying to increase transparency without jeopardizing the potential of trust-based commercial sharing.

Despite assumptions that counterproductive work behavior (CWB) leads to detrimental outcomes for organizations, most of the existing CWB research focuses on outcomes for the individual employee. In the present study, we clarify fundamental issues regarding unit-level CWB, including its definition and how it is distinct from individual-level CWB. We then use social information-processing (SIP) theory as a lens to articulate our hypotheses regarding the factors associated with unit-level CWB’s emergence (e.g., collective attitudes, human resources practices, leadership) as well as its relationship with unit-level performance (e.g., profit, customer satisfaction). We use meta-analysis (representing 7,110 units and over 391,000 employees) to test our hypotheses. Our results show that unit-level CWB is significantly related to antecedents such as collective job attitudes, the use of strategic human resource management practices (e.g., staffing, training, rewards), and collective perceptions of the work environment (e.g., unit-level fairness perceptions). Moreover, we demonstrate that unit-level CWB is empirically linked to unit-level productivity (ρ = −.23), turnover (ρ = .22), customer satisfaction (ρ = −.26), and profit (ρ = −.31), which verifies the detrimental consequences of CWB at the strategic level. We conclude with a detailed discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of this study as well as a clear plan for future research.

Over the past decade, the rise of blockchain technology has led to the emergence of a growing number of decentralized platforms that are governed less by platform owners and more through community efforts. The emergence of blockchain platforms offers a unique opportunity to examine alternative structures for platform governance and to develop a theory around the value of centralized, semi-decentralized, and decentralized governance. Drawing on mechanism design theory, we evaluate the tradeoffs between centralization and decentralization and hypothesize semi-decentralization as a higher performing governance structure. Empirical evidence from the blockchain industry shows that decentralization has an inverted U-shaped relationship with platforms’ market capitalization, developer attention, and development activity. We further examine factors driving the decentralization of platform governance and find that digital platforms of the infrastructure layer—relative to those of the application layer—have a tendency to become more decentralized. This tendency, nevertheless, can be offset by experienced leaders to achieve semi-decentralization. Overall, this study contributes new insights on the characteristics, antecedents, and consequences of effective platform governance.