Knowledge that Transforms

AbstractDrawing from meaning maintenance theory, the authors posit that paradoxical leader behaviour causes some employees to feel subjectively ambivalent, depending on holistic thinking styles. Employees who feel ambivalent will then show greater creativity as they search for ways to alleviate discomfort, again depending on thinking styles. Two field studies, one using cross‐sectional and one using panel data, confirm the hypotheses. For low (high) holistic thinkers, paradoxical leadership is more (less) positively associated with subjective ambivalence, and ambivalence is more (less) positively associated with creativity. The results offer theoretical and practical implications that holistic thinking determines whether paradoxical leadership evokes subjective ambivalence and subsequent creativity.

AbstractNatural resource scarcity is giving rise to new forms of resource governance and so enhancing the transition to more sustainable resource use. One key development is the growth of circular economy systems, where residual resources are reused in closed‐loop systems. This requires an understanding of how diverse actors collectively govern the sustainable use and sharing of privately owned residual and waste resources. Our empirical analysis of three circular economy systems in Finland, the United States and Spain shows how a polycentric form of governance develops through collective action between businesses, the public sector, and societal actors based on multiple units of cooperation. Adopting insights from the polycentric governance of commons, we develop a theory of polycentric governance for privately owned residual resources. Our findings show that polycentric governance involves three main interacting elements: mutual adjustment between actors, practices for collective agency, and structures for sharing resources. As well as contributing to the understanding of collective action for sustainability, these findings also advance the interorganizational governance literature.

AbstractA large body of work argues that the accumulation of organizational experience fosters learning because firms can correctly modify their understandings on the basis of past actions and their outcomes. But although performance information on past decisions can often be delayed, little research considered how firms respond to experience without complete performance information. In this study, we propose that experience is a double‐edged sword: whereas experience with performance feedback can foster learning, experience without complete performance feedback impedes learning. Using a sample of 7,223 private equity buyout investments, we find that experience with (in)complete performance information increases (decreases) the performance of a subsequent investment. The positive impact of experience with complete performance information is amplified when firms engage in search, following a shortfall in their performance. Moreover, we find that experience with (in)complete performance information decreases (increases) excessive risk taking. Overall, we advance the experiential learning literature by unpacking the positive and negative impact of experiential learning.

AbstractThis paper explores how political connections influence firms’ credit benefits, especially when the political environment improves. The authors distinguish two types of political connections – connections to government officials and connections to council deputies – according to whether the political benefits they provide are exclusive and definite. Employing a panel data set comprised of Chinese listed firms’ bank‐loan contracts from 2008 to 2014, they find politically connected firms – and particularly firms with connections to government officials – enjoy significantly lower loan costs than their non‐connected counterparts. Moreover, they find that anti‐corruption efforts, which reflect improvement in the political environment, reduce the credit benefits of political connections, but only for firms that have connections to government officials. Results emphasize the value of unpacking the heterogeneity of political connections and illuminate the importance of more complete assessment of corporate political strategies in changing political environments.

AbstractIn the face of intractable societal grand challenges, organizations increasingly resort to responsible innovation – that is, they pledge to create value for multiple stakeholders through developing new products or services that avoid doing harm and improve conditions for people and the planet. While the link between responsible innovation and societal improvements has been established, organizations pursuing responsible innovation lack governance mechanisms to guide the allocation of the value created – both economic and social – among heterogeneous stakeholders, in line with their responsible intent. We combine the value‐based strategy and stakeholder perspectives and infuse a deliberative process to design a three‐stage model of value allocation that rests on three key organizational decisions: i) what value to create and for whom, ii) how to appropriate the value created vis‐à‐vis unintended value appropriators, and iii) how to distribute the value appropriated among intended stakeholders. We propose a framework of stakeholder governance comprised of four novel mechanisms by which organizations can allocate value among their multiple principal stakeholders as part of participative processes. Our study contributes to responsible innovation and corporate governance research by unpacking how new value is managed to solve societal grand challenges.

AbstractGrand societal challenges (GSCs) represent complex, multi‐level, multi‐dimensional problems that require concerted efforts by various actors – public, private, and non‐profit – to be successfully addressed. Businesses – alone or in conjunction with governmental and non‐profit organizations – are relevant actors in this regard, as they represent a source of innovation. Responsible innovation (RI) is a framework that allows for the governance and evaluation of innovations with regard to their potential harmful consequences and positive contributions to societal challenges. Moreover, it stipulates that this evaluation process should be facilitated by appropriate governance structures at various levels. The aim of this article is to expand theorizing on GSCs and RI and to encourage research that explores their links. We outline pertinent characteristics of GSCs that make current conceptualizations of corporate social responsibility and social innovation limited in addressing GSCs. We explicate the reflexive and participative capacities of RI governance as a complementary and promising way forward. Finally, we introduce the contributions to this Special Issue as illustrations of relevant theoretical and empirical groundwork around GSCs and RI, and outline the agenda for future research.

AbstractThrough an inductive field study, we set out to better understand how and why ventures would embrace a non‐core stigma; this is perplexing given that a majority of stigma literature suggests that organizations tend to avoid/disidentify from stigmatized entities. To do so, we study organizational locational stigma, which we define as a label arising from an organization's geographic location that evokes a collective stakeholder group‐specific perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep‐seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization. Our findings from Detroit, Michigan reveal that entrepreneurs embrace the locational stigma by taking part in Detroit's underdog narrative and comeback story. Entrepreneurs use the underdog narrative in hope of differentiating their ventures from those in other locations, while they leverage the comeback story to gain access to the resources and in‐group advantages. We thus advance the concept of locational stigma and show how it can benefit organizations.

AbstractHow can state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) become more innovative in emerging economies where market competition emerges and state socialism remains? Rooted in a state socialism logic that traditionally prioritizes central planning, SOEs are increasingly challenged by a market competition logic espousing efficiency and innovation. We posit that the challenge, stemming from the grip of the state as the ultimate owner, may be mitigated for some SOEs under pyramidal ownership. A pyramid features SOEs being organized into chains of firms, creating indirect ownership and control through pyramidal layers. Such layers insulate state intervention in lower‐tier SOEs, loosening the grip of the state socialism logic and facilitating corresponding SOEs’ acceptance of the market competition logic, as reflected in more innovation. Leveraging a sample of SOEs in China, we find that SOEs innovate more when the number of pyramidal layers between them and the state increases. In addition, the innovation‐facilitating role of pyramidal ownership hinges on industry regulations and institutional development. Overall, this paper integrates research on institutional logics and pyramidal ownership to deepen our understanding of SOE innovation.