The authors draw on emerging research in organization theory to suggest how different firm-level identity orientations (individualistic, relational, or collectivistic) impact governance choice. They develop a conceptual framework that focuses on the relationship between a focal firm’s own identity orientation and that of a value chain partner. The framework identifies a series of match and mismatch scenarios, where the latter represent unique governance problems that are not accounted for by existing theory. Some of the mismatch scenarios involve pseudo-matches that resemble convergent orientations between parties but actually represent governance problems. Theoretically, this framework advances the governance literature by providing a comprehensive and nuanced account of (1) the orientations that parties bring to bear on a relationship, and (2) how their effects vary depending on the interdependence structure between the parties. The authors also advance the general literature on identity orientation by connecting it to concrete governance practices, by showing how multiple internal identity orientations create unique internal governance challenges, and by delineating two possible solutions to these challenges. They rely on the framework to develop managerial guidelines for governance choice.

The authors examine new product outcomes in the context of regional clusters. On the basis of prior research on marketing relationships, clusters, and social networks, they propose that the overall configuration of a cluster helps promote particular governance practices among its members. These practices have distinct value-creating properties, and when they are brought to bear on a specific new product development project within a cluster, they promote performance outcomes such as product novelty and speed to market. Ultimately, these performance effects are reinforced by the configuration of the cluster itself. In general, the authors propose that new product outcomes result from complex interactions between a cluster's macro-level configuration and its micro-level governance processes. More broadly, their framework points to the importance of geographical variables and to the role of “place” in marketing decision making.

Increasingly, marketing activity is carried out within temporary organizations, whereby teams are assembled to complete a specific task within a predetermined time frame. Such organizations are uniquely suited to promoting various marketing outcomes but are not well understood. From a practical standpoint, their inherent characteristics create organizational challenges that, if not appropriately managed, can compromise performance. Drawing on agency theory and research on embedded ties, the authors conceptualize these challenges in terms of particular selection and enforcement problems. They identify three forms of temporary marketing organizations that vary in their selection and enforcement qualities. Next, the authors develop a conceptual framework that shows the selection and enforcement implications of a temporary organization’s task, timeline, and team composition. They also demonstrate that selection and enforcement mechanisms have portable qualities and can be “imported” to a given temporary organization, from either a prior temporary organization or a larger permanent one.

The authors draw on the sociological theories of the “liability of newness” and the “liability of adolescence” to generate new insights into relationship evolution. First, they show how a new relationship in its “honeymoon” phase exhibits a unique constellation of two conditions, namely information asymmetry and forbearance. Next, they explain how a relationship evolves along two processes that involve passive learning and decay, respectively. In themselves, these processes will move a relationship toward a long-term “transactional” state and possibly termination, but the processes can also be actively shaped using various governance mechanisms. Doing so, however, requires a nuanced account of types of governance mechanisms and the particular conditions they are intended to induce. The authors consider how the general mechanisms of (1) incentives and (2) information sharing can be deployed in standardized or customized fashions, respectively. Next, they suggest how different manifestation of governance mechanisms impact a relationship's underlying evolutionary processes and evolved relationship states. In general, their framework represents a new perspective on relationship evolution—one that involves the purposeful management of initial conditions and their related evolutionary processes.