The paper begins with a critical examination of four mistaken propositions that characterize much of the conventional wisdom on capital income taxation. The analysis then shows the correct approach to evaluating the welfare cost of alternative tax treatments of capital income when taxes affect both the supply of labor and the timing of consumption.

The classic example of an unshiftable tax is the general tax on pure rental income. Since Ricardo, economists have believed that the annual net rental income of unimproved land falls by the amount of the annual tax and its price by the capitalized value of this tax. This paper shows that these conclusions are false, that the tax on pure land rents is at least partly shifted, and that the price of land may be increased by the imposition of a tax. Implications are suggested for the analysis of the corporate income tax and the taxation of natural resources.

The typical worker who is laid off is soon rehired by his original employer. This important and generally unnoticed fact requires a major reevaluation of our current theories of unemployment. This paper develops a theory of temporary layoffs. Specific attention is given to the question of why employment is reduced instead of hours. The role of unemployment insurance and of taxes is examined in detail.

Social-security retirement benefits distort the saving decisions of workers who are rational enough to save for their future. Since the implicit rate of return in an unfunded social-security program is less than the marginal product of capital, the resulting decline in saving causes a welfare loss. The present paper examines the conditions under which the welfare loss can be reduced by replacing the current universal social-security program with a means-tested program that pays benefits only to those individuals with little or no other retirement income or assets.

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