Knowledge that Transforms

In a recent issue of this Journal, Carr and Mathewson (1988) test a model of the impact of limited and unlimited liability regimes on the nature of firms by comparing the performance of law firms operated as partnerships and sole proprietorships (and therefore subject to unlimited liability) with that of law firms operated as corporations (and therefore subject to limited liability).' In their model, "unlimited liability by raising the cost of ownership rights discourages investment in the firm, causing legal firms to be inefficiently small" (p. 779). The peculiar history of organizational form in the legal profession seemed to provide an opportunity to test their model's prediction. Prior to the 1960s, state law prevented law firms from incorporating, with the effect that unlimited liability was mandated. During the 1960s and early 1970s, a large number of states passed statutes that allowed law and other professional service firms to incorporate, thereby giving such firms the option to elect either an unlimited or a limited liability regime. The result was a universe that included some law firms that were subject to unlimited liability and some that were subject to limited liability.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

We develop a method to solve and simulate cash-in-advance models of money and asset prices. We calibrate the models to U.S. data spanning the period 1890-1987 and study some empirical regularities observed over this period. The phenomena of interest include the average level of stock returns and returns on nominal bonds, the covariation of realized real interest rates and real asset returns with inflation, and the ability of nominal interest rates to predict inflation and nominal stock returns.

We study the phenomenon of short-run increasing returns to labor (SRIRL) in a sample of 10 interwar U.S. manufacturing industries. Our main findings are that SRIRL was common in the interwar period and that the pattern of SRIRL across industries was similar to that observed in the postwar period. We argue that, since presumably the Depression was not caused by technical regress, these findings are inconsistent with the claim of real business cycle theorists that SRIRL is in general due to procyclical technical shocks. We propose tests for discriminating between two other leading explanations of SRIRL but find that our conclusions differ by industry.

We develop an overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth in which human capital is the engine of growth and the generations are linked through material and emotional interdependencies within the family. Parents invest in their children to achieve both old-age support (care) and emotional gratification, and material support from children is determined through self-enforcing implicit contracts. We show that optimal intergenerational trade can then lead to maximization of growth opportunities. Our model produces a theory of the "demographic transition" linking longevity, fertility, and economic growth. We also show that while population aging may raise the growth rate, an increase in young-age longevity is likely to produce a greater increase in the growth rate and a reduction in the fertility rate in a growth equilibrium. These predictions and the model's implications concerning the behavior of private savings during the takeoff period appear consistent with empirical evidence.

Purchasing power parity is one of the most important equilibrium conditions in international macroeconomics. Empirically, it is also one of the most hotly contested. Numerous recent studies, for example, have sought to determine the validity of purchasing power parity using data from the post-Bretton Woods float and have reached different conclusions. We assert that most such studies are flawed for two reasons. First, the post-1973 data contain, by definition, only a very limited amount of the low-frequency information relevant for examination of long-run parity. Second, the dynamic econometric techniques used to model deviations from parity are typically quite crude with respect to admissible low-frequency dynamics. Both deficiencies are rectified in the present paper, with dramatic results. We construct a new data set of 16 real exchange rates covering more than a century of the classic gold standard period, and we study deviations from parity using long-memory models that allow for subtle forms of mean reversion. For each real exchange rate, we find that purchasing power parity holds in the long run.

This paper interprets seventeenth-century mercantilism in light of recent theories of strategic trade policy. Long-distance international commerce during the mercantilist period was undertaken chiefly by state-chartered monopoly trading companies and was therefore conducted under conditions of imperfect competition. The economic structure of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry for the East India trade provides an excellent illustration of an environment in which the profit-sharting motive for strategic trade policies exists. Dutch supremacy in the early East India trade was facilitated by a managerial incentive scheme in the monopoly charter that enabled it to achieve a Stackelberg leadership position against the English. Using data from the East India trade around 1620 in a Cournot duopoly model, I find that the managerial incentives yielded greater Dutch profits than would have been obtained from a standard profit-maximizing objective and that the scope for other strategic trade policies was clearly present.

This paper explores some macroeconomic implications of including household production in an otherwise standard real business cycle model. The authors calibrate the model on the basis of microeconomic evidence and long-run considerations, simulate it, and examine its statistical properties. They find that introducing home production significantly improves the quantitative performance of the standard model along several dimensions. It also implies a very different interpretation of the nature of aggregate fluctuations. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

This paper develops a two-region, two-sector general equilibriun model of location. The location of agricultural production is fixed, but ionopolistcally competitive manufacturing finns choose their location to maximize profits. If transportation costs are high, returns to scale weak, and the share of spending on manufactured goods low, the incentive to produce close to the market leads to an equal division of manufacturing between the regions. With lower transport costs, stronger scale economies, or a higher manufacturing share, circular causation sets in: the more manufacturing is located in one region, the larger that region's share of demand, and this provides an incentive to locate still more manufacturing there. Thus when the parameters of the economy lie even slightly on one side of a critical "phase boundary", all manufacturing production ends up concentrated in only one region.

This paper determines when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders. This is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. This provides a theory of bank loan demand and of the role of monitoring in circumstances in which reputation effects are important. A key result is that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans, and in periods of high interest rates or low future profitability, higher-rated borrowers choose to borrow from banks.