Knowledge that Transforms

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Life Earnings and Rural‐Urban Migration

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(S1), S29-S59 open access
This paper is a theoretical study of rural‐urban migration—urbanization—as it has occurred in many low‐income economies in the postwar period. This process is viewed as a transfer of labor from a traditional, land‐intensive technology to a human capital–intensive technology with an unending potential for growth. The model emphasizes the role of cities as places in which new immigrants can accumulate the skills required by modern production technologies.

Judicial Checks and Balances

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(2), 445-470 open access
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new database of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common-law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom. This paper is a radical revision of an earlier paper by the same authors, “The Guarantees

Inequality and Segregation

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(6), 1296-1321 open access
Despite declining group inequality and the rapid expansion of the black middle class in the United States, major urban centers with significant black populations continue to exhibit extreme racial separation. Using a theoretical framework in which individuals care about both the affluence and the racial composition of neighborhoods, we show that lower inequality is consistent with extreme and even rising levels of segregation in cities in which the minority population is large. Our results can help explain why segregation continues to characterize the urban landscape even though survey evidence suggests that individuals favor more integration than they did in the past.

Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business Cycles

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(6), 1223-1256 open access
We measure the cost of consumption fluctuations using an approach that does not require the specification of preferences and instead uses asset prices. We measure the marginal cost of consumption fluctuations, the per unit benefit of a marginal reduction in consumption fluctuations expressed as a percentage of lifetime consumption. We find that the gains from eliminating all consumption uncertainty are very large. However, for consumption fluctuations corresponding to business cycle frequencies, we estimate the marginal cost to be between 0.08 percent and 0.49 percent of lifetime consumption.

The Economics of Has‐beens

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(S1), S289-S310 open access
The evolution of technology causes human capital to become obsolete. We study this phenomenon in an overlapping generations setting, assuming that technology evolves stochastically and that older workers find updating uneconomic. Experience and learning by doing may offer the old some income protection, but technology advance always turns them into has‐beens to some degree. We focus on the determinants (demand elasticities, persistence of technology change, etc.) of the severity of the has‐beens effect. It can be large, even leading to negatively sloped within‐occupation age‐earnings profiles and an occupation dominated by a few young, high‐income workers. Architecture displays the sort of features the theory identifies as magnifying the has‐beens effect, and both anecdotes and some data suggest that the has‐beens effect in architecture is extreme indeed.

The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(1), 209-239 open access
I study the interaction between imperfect labor contracts and international trade in a setting in which workers have private information about their own abilities. When an individual’s contribution to firm output can be measured accurately in some activities but not in others, the most able workers select occupations in which their pay most closely reflects their own performance. In a world economy with two otherwise similar countries that have different distributions of talent, the country with the more heterogeneous labor force exports the good that is produced by the most talented individuals. In this country, trade exacerbates the “polarization” of the labor force and often worsens the distribution of income.

Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(4), 932-938 open access
Fifty years ago, Harsanyi published the first of his seminal two papers on utilitarianism. His results were derived within the von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility theory. A year later, Savage incorporated subjective probability into expected utility theory in his famous book. In this note we extend Harsanyi’s utilitarianism to Savage’s framework. We show that a Pareto condition implies utilitarian aggregation: both society’s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals. This conclusion contrasts the impossibility of reconciling a Pareto condition and linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes, that was noted by several authors. We argue that the indiscriminate Pareto condition considered by these authors is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows the extension of Harsanyi’s result to Savage’s framework.

Global Sourcing

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(3), 552-580 open access
We present a North‐South model of international trade in which differentiated products are developed in the North. Sectors are populated by final‐good producers who differ in productivity levels. On the basis of productivity and sectoral characteristics, firms decide whether to integrate into the production of intermediate inputs or outsource them. In either case they have to decide from which country to source the inputs. Final‐good producers and their suppliers must make relationship‐specific investments, both in an integrated firm and in an arm’s‐length relationship. We describe an equilibrium in which firms with different productivity levels choose different ownership structures and supplier locations. We then study the effects of within‐sectoral heterogeneity and variations in industry characteristics on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms.

Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(2), 348-396 open access
We investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade‐off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population. We consider heterogeneity in income, race, ethnicity, and religion, and we test the model using American school districts, school attendance areas, municipalities, and special districts. We find strong evidence of a trade‐off between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity; we also find evidence of a trade‐off between economies of scale and income heterogeneity. Conversely, we find little evidence that ethnic or religious heterogeneity shapes jurisdictions. To clarify the direction of causality between heterogeneity and jurisdictions, we exploit shocks to racial heterogeneity generated by the two world wars.

Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(3), 665-694 open access
We provide a new and more complete analysis of the origins of the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, one of the most severe environmental crises in North America in the twentieth century. Severe drought and wind erosion hit the Great Plains in 1930 and lasted through 1940. There were similar droughts in the 1950s and 1970s, but no comparable level of wind erosion. We explain why. The prevalence of small farms in the 1930s limited private solutions for controlling the downwind externalities associated with wind erosion. Drifting sand from unprotected fields damaged neighboring farms. Small farmers cultivated more of their land and were less likely to invest in erosion control than larger farmers. Soil conservation districts, established by the government after 1937, helped coordinate erosion control. This “unitized” solution for collective action is similar to that used in other natural resource/environmental settings.