Knowledge that Transforms

In most times and places, women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is diminishing. In a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the roles of females, the relative desirability of females as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. We study an equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the properties of equilibrium.

Characteristics of business cycles are quite different across developed countries. Real wages and working hours are less sensitive to exogenous shocks in the United States than they are in Britain and Japan. Using a model with a microeconomic foundation, this paper provides an economic explanation of these differences. The cost of on-the-job training plays a crucial role. Workers seldom quit their jobs when the sunk training cost is high. In such economies variances in employment and output become small and shocks tend to be absorbed by working hours and real wages. Thus these characteristics do not necessarily indicate that the economy is more efficient.

Using data from the March Current Population Survey, we document an increase over the past 30 years in wage inequality for males. Between 1963 and 1989, real average weekly wages for the least skilled workers (as measured by the tenth percentile of the wage distribution) declined by about 5 percent, whereas wages for the most skilled workers (as measured by the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution) rose by about 40 percent. We find that the trend toward increased wage inequality is apparent within narrowly defined education and labor market experience groups. Our interpretation is that much of the increase in wage inequality for males over the last 20 years is due to increased returns to the components of skill other than years of schooling and years of labor market experience. Our primary explanation for the general rise in returns to skill is that the demand for skill rose in the United States over this period.

It is widely believed that rent control leads to a decline in the quality of rental housing. This study examines the effect of rent control on the quality of rental housing in New York City. Quality change is linked to the suppression of rent below market levels and other characteristics of the housing unit. We develop a first-order nonstationary, heterogeneous Markov model that allows for true state dependence, observed heterogeneity, nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity, and a mover-stayer structure. The results offer some support for the belief that rent control leads to a deterioration in housing quality but suggest the need for additional investigation of this issue.

There has been an enormous increase in auditing and accounting standards and in litigation against auditors. This paper examines some of the consequences of these changes by developing a model of the audit market relating auditors' liability to auditing standards. The paper demonstrates how equilibrium audit fees depend on both the informational value of the audit and the option value of the claim financial statement users have on the auditor's wealth in the event the audit is determined to have been substandard. Auditors' attitudes toward and responses to auditing standards are studied, and characteristics of optimal liability rules are evaluated.

An important step in extending the traditional theory of individual rational choice to analyze social issues beyond those usually considered by economists is to incorporate into the theory a much richer class of attitudes, preferences, and calculations. While this approach to behavior builds on an expanded theory of individual choice, it is not mainly concerned with individuals. It uses theory at the micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the group or macro level. The lecture describes the approach and illustrates it with examples drawn from my past and current work.

Milton Friedman has claimed that his monetary economics derives from a Chicago Tradition that, in the 1930s, offered a monetary explanation of cyclical fluctuations in general and the Great Depression in particular, an optimistic view of the power of monetary policy, and a case for governing it by rules rather than discretion. It is argued that all the elements of this tradition except the last are to be found in earlier writings of Ralph Hawtrey, Allyn Young, and Lauchlin Currie and that there is much evidence to point to a direct influence running from Hawtrey, through Harvard to Chicago.