Knowledge that Transforms

An informed advisor wishes to convey her valuable information to an uninformed decision maker with identical preferences. Thus she has a current incentive to truthfully reveal her information. But if the decision maker thinks that the advisor might be biased in favor of one decision and the advisor does not wish to be thought to be biased, the advisor has a reputational incentive to lie. If the advisor is sufficiently concerned about her reputation, no information is conveyed in equilibrium. In a repeated version of this game, the advisor will care (instrumentally) about her reputation simply because she wants her valuable and unbiased advice to have an impact on future decisions. I.

This paper examines the role of individual instruction and teacher quality in determining economic growth and convergence across school districts. The model shows that if teacher quality is more important for human capital accumulation than individual instruction, human capital convergence will occur between two school districts. This convergence arises because a poor school district hires relatively better teachers but uses them in larger classes in comparison with a rich school district. The model is estimated on panel data of the states of the United States from 1882 to 1990. The estimates indicate that teacher quality is relatively more important for human capital accumulation than individual instruction. The model accounts for all the mean growth in state per capita incomes and between 80 and 100 percent of convergence in state per capita incomes.

African American motorists in the United States are more likely than white motorists to have their cars searched by police checking for illegal drugs and other contraband. The courts are faced with the task of deciding on the basis of traffic-stop data whether police are basing their decisions to stop cars on the race of the driver. We develop a model of law enforcement for a population with two racial types who also differ along other dimensions relevant to criminal behavior. We discuss why a simple test commonly applied by the courts is inadequate when the econometrician observes only a subset of the characteristics observed by the policemen. Next, we show how to construct a test for whether di¤erential treatment is motivated purely out of e¢ciency grounds, i.e. to maximize the number of arrests, or re‡ects racial prejudice. The test is valid even when the set of characteristics observed by the policemen are only partially observable by the econometrician. We apply the tests for discrimination to traffic stop data from Maryland. Finally, we present a

This paper explores the ability of conditional versions of the CAPM and the consumption CAPMjointly the (C)CAPMto explain the cross section of average stock returns. Central to our approach is the use of the log consumptionwealth ratio as a conditioning variable. We demonstrate that such conditional models perform far better than unconditional specifications and about as well as the Fama-French three-factor model on portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market characteristics. The conditional consumption CAPM can account for the difference in returns between low-book-to-market and high-book-to-market portfolios and exhibits little evidence of residual size or book-to-market effects.

Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, if the relationship lender needs funds before the loan matures, she may demand to liquidate early, or require a return premium, when she lends directly. Borrowers also risk losing funding. The costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile capital structure, subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from depositors' liquidity needs. Stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, narrow banking, and suspension of convertibility, may reduce liquidity creation.

We study the provision of public goods when all agents have complete information and can write binding agreements. This framework is in deliberate contrast to a traditional view of the free‐rider problem based on hidden information or voluntary provision. We focus on coalition formation as a potential source of inefficiency. To this end, we develop a notion of an equilibrium coalition structure, based on the assumption that each coalition that forms does so under a rational prediction of the society‐wide coalition structure. In a simple model, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium coalition structure. Only in some cases does the equilibrium involve full cooperation, resulting in efficient provision of the public good. In other cases, the equilibrium consists of several coalitions and inefficient provision. However, the degree of inefficiency and the number of possible coalitions are bounded.

This paper presents a theory of rent seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members. The two key assumptions are constraints on lump‐sum transfers from poorer members and disproportionate control rights wielded by wealthier members. Transfers of rents to the latter are achieved by depressing prices paid for inputs supplied by members and diverting resulting retained earnings. The theory predicts that increased heterogeneity of landholdings in the local area causes increased inefficiency by inducing a lower input price and a lower level of installed crushing capacity. Predictions concerning the effect of the distribution of local landownership on sugarcane price, capacity levels, and participation rates of different classes of farmers are confirmed by data from nearly 100 sugar cooperatives in the Indian state of Maharashtra over the period 1971–93.