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Cyclicality, Mortality, and the Value of Time: The Case of Coffee Price Fluctuations and Child Survival in Colombia

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(1), 113-155 open access
Recent studies demonstrate procyclical mortality in wealthy countries, but there are reasons to expect a countercyclical relationship in developing nations. We investigate how child survival in Colombia responds to fluctuations in world Arabica coffee prices - and document starkly procyclical child deaths. In studying this result's behavioral underpinnings, we highlight that: (1) The leading determinants of child health are inexpensive but require considerable time, and (2) As the value of time declines with falling coffee prices, so does the relative price of health. We find a variety of direct evidence consistent with the primacy of time in child health production.

Competition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships in Capital Markets

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(3), 599-647
We show that information flows between investment banks and their clients affect relationships and that shocks to these flows affect corporate investment. Firms avoid sharing investment banks in their industry, but only when they engage in product market competition. This suggests that concerns about disclosure of confidential information to strategic rivals determine firms’ investment bank choices. Using exogenous shocks to information flows arising from bank mergers, we show that the desire to avoid sharing banks has a substantial effect on investment. These information effects help us understand how the investment banking industry is structured, how banks compete, and how prices are set.

Market Penetration Costs and the New Consumers Margin in International Trade

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(6), 1151-1199
This paper develops a novel theory of marketing costs within a trade model with product differentiation and heterogeneity in firm productivities. A firm enters a market if it is profitable to incur the marginal cost to reach a single consumer. It then faces an increasing marginal penetration cost to access additional consumers. The model, therefore, can reconcile the observed positive relationship between entry and market size with the existence of many small exporters in each exporting market. Comparative statics of trade liberalization predict a large increase in trade for goods with positive but low volumes of previous trade.

Altruism, Favoritism, and Guilt in the Allocation of Family Resources: Sophie’s Choice in Mao’s Mass Send‐Down Movement

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(1), 1-38
We use survey data on twins in urban China, among whom many experienced the consequences of the forced mass rustication movement of the Cultural Revolution, to identify the roles of altruism, favoritism, and guilt in affecting family behavior. We exploit the fact that many families were forced to select one of their adolescent children to be sent down. We show the conditions under which guilt, favoritism, and altruism can be identified using such data. We find that parents behaved altruistically, showed favoritism, but also exhibited guilt: the child experiencing more rustication years received higher parental transfers despite having higher earnings.

Optimal Information Disclosure

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(5), 949-987
A sender randomly draws a “prospect” characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver. The receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his Bayesian inference about the prospect’s relevance exceeds his opportunity cost. The sender’s profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure, whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects (“switches”) by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones (“baits”). Extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives.

Explaining the Favorite–Long Shot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or Misperceptions?

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(4), 723-746
The favorite–long shot bias describes the long-standing empirical regularity that betting odds provide biased estimates of the probability of a horse winning: long shots are overbet whereas favorites are underbet. Neoclassical explanations of this phenomenon focus on rational gamblers who overbet long shots because of risk-love. The competing behavioral explanations emphasize the role of misperceptions of probabilities. We provide novel empirical tests that can discriminate between these competing theories by assessing whether the models that explain gamblers’ choices in one part of their choice set (betting to win) can also rationalize decisions over a wider choice set, including compound bets in the exacta, quinella, or trifecta pools. Using a new, large-scale data set ideally suited to implement these tests, we find evidence in favor of the view that misperceptions of probability drive the favorite–long shot bias, as suggested by prospect theory.

Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(5), 833-865
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders’ marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent.

Does Professor Quality Matter? Evidence from Random Assignment of Students to Professors

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(3), 409-432
In primary and secondary education, measures of teacher quality are often based on contemporaneous student performance on standardized achievement tests. In the postsecondary environment, scores on student evaluations of professors are typically used to measure teaching quality. We possess unique data that allow us to measure relative student performance in mandatory follow‐on classes. We compare metrics that capture these three different notions of instructional quality and present evidence that professors who excel at promoting contemporaneous student achievement teach in ways that improve their student evaluations but harm the follow‐on achievement of their students in more advanced classes.

Why Do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(1), 39-75
This paper constructs a model of saving for retired single people that includes heterogeneity in medical expenses and life expectancies, and bequest motives. We estimate the model using Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old data and the method of simulated moments. Out-of-pocket medical expenses rise quickly with age and permanent income. The risk of living long and requiring expensive medical care is a key driver of saving for many higher-income elderly. Social insurance programs such as Medicaid rationalize the low asset holdings of the poorest but also benefit the rich by insuring them against high medical expenses at the ends of their lives. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence during the Indonesian Financial Crisis

Journal of Political Economy 2010 118(2), 300-354
This paper tests a model in which group identity in the form of religious intensity functions as ex post insurance. I exploit relative price shocks induced by the Indonesian financial crisis to demonstrate a causal relationship between economic distress and religious intensity (Koran study and Islamic school attendance) that is weaker for other forms of group identity. Consistent with ex post insurance, credit availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity, religious intensity alleviates credit constraints, and religious institutions smooth consumption shocks across households and within households, particularly for those who were less religious before the crisis. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.