Knowledge that Transforms

Managers use internal competition to motivate worker effort, yet economic theory suggests that the benefits of competition may depend critically on workers’ relative abilities — large differences in skill may reduce competitors’ efforts. This paper uses panel data from professional golfers and finds that the presence of a superstar in a rank-order tournament is associated with lower competitor performance. On average, higher-skill PGA golfers’ first-round scores are approximately 0.2 strokes higher when Tiger Woods participates, relative to when Woods is absent. The overall superstar effect for tournaments is approximately 0.8 strokes. The adverse superstar effect increases when Woods is playing well and disappears during Woods’s weaker periods. There is no evidence that reduced performance is due to “riskier” play.

We propose an equilibrium model that can explain a wide range of international finance puzzles, including the high correlation of international stock markets, despite the lack of correlation of fundamentals. We conduct an empirical analysis of our model, which combines cross-country-correlated long-run risk with Epstein and Zin preferences, using U.S. and U.K. data, and show that it successfully reconciles international prices and quantities, thereby solving the international equity premium puzzle. These results provide evidence suggesting a link between common long-run growth perspectives and exchange rate movements.

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We argue that the government-spending multiplier can be much larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds. The larger is the fraction of government spending that occurs while the nominal interest rate is zero, the larger is the value of the multiplier. After providing intuition for these results, we investigate the size of the multiplier in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model. In this model the multiplier e�ect is substantially larger than one when the zero bound binds. Our model is consistent with the behavior of key macro aggregates during the recent financial crisis. We thank the editor, Monika Piazzesi, Rob Shimer, and two anonymous referees for their

I construct a dynamic model of transactions in used capital to understand the role of leasing when trading is subject to frictions. Firms trade assets to adjust their productive capacity in response to shocks to profitability. Transaction costs hinder the efficiency of the allocation of capital, and lessors act as trading intermediaries who reduce trading frictions. The model predicts that leased assets trade more frequently and produce more output than owned assets, for two reasons. First, high-volatility firms are more likely to lease than low-volatility firms, since they expect to adjust their capacity more frequently. Second, ownership's larger transaction costs widen owners' inaction bands relative to lessees'. Using data on commercial aircraft, I find that leased aircraft have holding durations 38-percent shorter and fly 6.5-percent more hours than owned aircraft. Additional tests indicate that most of these differential patterns in trading and utilization arise because owners have wider inaction bands than lessees, and carriers' self-selection into leasing plays a minor role.

Scholars differ on whether central bank intervention mitigates banking panics. In April 1929, a fruit fly infestation in Florida forced the U.S. government to quarantine fruit shipments from the state and destroy infested groves. In July, depositors panicked in Tampa and surrounding cities. The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta rushed currency to member banks beset by runs. We show that this intervention arrested the panic and estimate that bank failures would have been twice as high without the Federal Reserve’s intervention. Our results suggest that similar interventions may have reduced bank failures during the Great Depression.

This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example, assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together. The main technical result is an existence theorem for approximate CEEI. The mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets. Its performance is explored on real data, and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice: all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets, and most are both manipulable and unfair.

Using factor methods, we decompose industrial production (IP) into components arising from aggregate and sector-specific shocks. An approximate factor model finds that nearly all of IP variability is associated with common factors. We then use a multisector growth model to adjust for the effects of input-output linkages in the factor analysis. Thus, a structural factor analysis indicates that the Great Moderation was characterized by a fall in the importance of aggregate shocks while the volatility of sectoral shocks was essentially unchanged. Consequently, the role of idiosyncratic shocks increased considerably after the mid-1980s, explaining half of the quarterly variation in IP.

We use a natural experiment in nineteenth-century Ohio to analyze the economic effects of two dominant land demarcation regimes, metes and bounds (MB) and the rectangular system (RS). MB is decentralized with plot shapes, alignment, and sizes defined individually; RS is a centralized grid of uniform square plots that does not vary with topography. We find large initial net benefits in land values from the RS and also that these effects persist into the twenty-first century. These findings reveal the importance of transaction costs and networks in affecting property rights, land values, markets, and economic growth.

Stochastic dominance is a partial order on risky assets (“gambles”) that is based on the uniform preference—of all decision-makers in an appropriate class—for one gamble over another. We modify this requirement, first, by taking into account the status quo (given by the current wealth) and the possibility of rejecting gambles, and second, by comparing rejections that are substantive (i.e., uniform over wealth levels or over utilities). This yields two new stochastic orders: “wealth-uniform dominance” and “utility-uniform dominance.” Unlike stochastic dominance, these two orders are complete: any two gambles can be compared. Moreover, they are equivalent to the orders induced by, respectively, the Aumann–Serrano index of riskiness and the Foster–Hart measure of riskiness.