Knowledge that Transforms

The paper presents empirical evidence based on the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey that accounting for limited asset market participation is important for estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Differences in estimates of the EIS between asset holders and non–asset holders are large and statistically significant. This is the case whether estimating the EIS on the basis of the Euler equation for stock index returns or the Euler equation for Treasury bills, in each case distinguishing between asset holders and non–asset holders as best as possible. Estimates of the EIS are around 0.3–0.4 for stockholders and around 0.8–1 for bondholders and are larger for households with larger asset holdings within these two groups.

This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of "distribution factors." These factors are defined as variables that affect the household members' bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set. We extend the collective labor supply model developed by Chiappori to allow for distribution factors. We show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process. The model is estimated using PSID data for the year 1988. Our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model. Also, the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects.

We examine whether two important theories of trade, the Heckscher‐Ohlin theory and the increasing returns theory, can account for the empirical success of the so‐called gravity equation. Since versions of both theories can predict this equation, we tackle the model identification problem by conditioning bilateral trade relations on factor endowment differences and on the share of intraindustry trade. Only for large differences in factor endowments does the Heckscher‐Ohlin model predict perfect production specialization in different countries as well as the gravity equation, and trade is purely in goods produced with different factor intensities. Our empirical analysis yields three findings. First, the predictions of the perfect specialization versions of both theories are rejected by the data and so are unlikely explanations for the empirical success of the gravity equation. Second, a model of imperfect specialization that includes both increasing returns and factor endowments as sources of trade has a mixed performance: it correctly predicts production of more differentiated goods when the level of intraindustry trade is greater; however, the predicted link to factor proportions is tenuous. Third, the predictions of a model with imperfect specialization that relies solely on differences in factor endowments find support in the data. These results suggest that factor endowments and increasing returns explain different components of the international variation of production patterns and trade volumes.

This paper seeks to explain the initial successes and failures of Protestantism on economic grounds. It argues that the medieval Roman Catholic Church, through doctrinal manipulation, the exclusion of rivals, and various forms of price discrimination, ultimately placed members seeking the Z good “spiritual services” on the margin of defection. These monopolistic practices encouraged entry by rival firms, some of which were aligned with civil governments. The paper hypothesizes that Protestant entry was facilitated in emergent entrepreneurial societies characterized by the decline of feudalism and relatively unstable distribution of wealth and repressed in more homogeneous, rent‐seeking societies that were mostly dissipating rather than creating wealth. In these societies the Roman Church was more able to continue the practice of price discrimination. Informal tests of this proposition are conducted by considering primogeniture and urban growth as proxies for wealth stability.

The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects: a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the Indian state of West Bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there.

Over the last three decades there has been a dramatic slowdown of the publication process at top economics journals. A substantial part is due to journals' requiring more extensive revisions. Various explanations are considered: democratization of the review process, increases in the complexity of papers, growth of the profession, and cost and benefit arguments. Changes in the profession are examined using time-series data. Connections between these changes and the slowdown are examined using paper-level data. There is evidence for some explanations, but most of the slowdown remains unexplained. Changes may reflect evolving social norms.

This paper studies premarital parental investments in children’s wealth, where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage. By investing in their children’s wealth, parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry. In large marriage markets, the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient. Marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition, but equilibrium investments are not efficient.

We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced "seed money" will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a nearly sixfold increase in contributions, with significant effects on both participation rates and average gift size. Imposing a refund increased contributions by a more modest 20 percent, with significant effects on average gift size.

Data for the United States and countries in western Europe indicate a negative correlation between the dependency ratio and labor tax rates and the generosity of social transfers, after other factors that influence the size of the welfare state are controlled for. This occurs despite the increased political clout of the dependent population implied by the aging of the population. This paper develops an overlapping generations model of intra‐ and intergenerational transfers (including old‐age social security) and human capital formation that addresses this seeming puzzle. We show that with democratic voting, an increase in the dependency ratio can lead to lower taxes or less generous social transfers.

This paper develops models of quality standards to examine two trends: academic journals increasingly require extensive revisions of submissions, and articles are becoming longer and changing in other ways. Papers are modeled as varying along two quality dimensions: q reflects the importance of the main ideas and r other aspects of quality. Observed trends are regarded as increases in r-quality. A static equilibrium model illustrates comparative statics explanations. A dynamic model in which referees (with a biased view of their own work) learn social norms for weighting q and r is shown to produce a long, gradual evolution of social norms.