Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. Owing to the anonymity of a large labor market, workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs. This randomness generates coordination frictions. Two workers may apply for a particular job, whereas an identical job gets no applications. The model generates assortative matching, with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers’ and firms’ types. It predicts that a worker’s wage is increasing in her job’s productivity and a firm’s profit is increasing in its employees’ productivity. The model also yields a version of the welfare theorems.

This paper evaluates the central insight of the consumption capital asset pricing model that an asset's expected return is determined by its equilibrium risk to consumption. Rather than measure risk by the contemporaneous covariance of an asset's return and consumption growth, we measure risk by the covariance of an asset's return and consumption growth cumulated over many quarters following the return. While contemporaneous consumption risk explains little of the variation in average returns across the 25 Fama‐French portfolios, our measure of ultimate consumption risk at a horizon of three years explains a large fraction of this variation.

I apply Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage to a theory of factor substitutability in a model with a continuum of worker and job types. Highly skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs. The model satisfies the distance‐dependent elasticity of substitution (DIDES) characteristic: substitutability between types declines with their skill distance. I analyze changes in relative wages due to human capital accumulation. The concept of a complexity dispersion parameter or compression elasticity is introduced. Empirical studies suggest its value to be equal to two: a 1 percent increase in the stock of human capital reduces the Mincerian return by 2 percent.

We present a model embodying moderate amounts of nominal rigidities that accounts for the observed inertia in inflation and persistence in output. The key features of our model are those that prevent a sharp rise in marginal costs after an expansionary shock to monetary policy. Of these features, the most important are staggered wage contracts that have an average duration of three quarters and variable capital utilization.

This paper considers a model of elections in which parties compete simultaneously for multiple districts. I show that if districts are heterogeneous, then a unique two‐party equilibrium exists under plurality rule in which further entry is deterred. The equilibrium requires that parties choose noncentrist policy platforms and not converge to the ideal policy of the median voter. These characteristics are consistent with empirical observation, in contrast to those of single‐district models. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are then characterized and related to Duverger’s law. The existence of multiple‐party equilibria in this environment is also considered.

This paper explores the implications for risk‐taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption. In contrast to previous analyses, we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market. We show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a “status good” and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good. The main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income, status, and consumption is the same, that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption, and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner.

We develop a matching model to account for the fact that worker turnover in Europe is much less than in the United States, whereas job turnover is roughly the same. The model assumes that the quality of worker‐firm matches is both an inspection good and an experience good. Both parties have limited information at the time of meeting about the match’s quality, which is completely revealed only by engaging in production. Hiring practices play a key allocational role in this economy. We show how labor policies distort hiring practices and assess the consequences for labor market dynamics and welfare.

This paper examines how manufacturers locate sales offices across cities. Sales office costs are assumed to have four components: a fixed cost, a frictional cost for out‐of‐town sales, a cost‐reducing knowledge spillover related to city size, and an idiosyncratic match quality for each firm‐city pair. A simple theoretical model is developed and is estimated using data from the Census of Wholesale Trade. The factors emphasized in the home market effect literature, namely, fixed costs and frictional costs, are found to play an important role in location decisions. Match quality also matters. The results for knowledge spillovers are mixed.

The Great Leap Forward disaster, characterized by a collapse in grain production and a widespread famine in China between 1959 and 1961, is found attributable to a systemic failure in central planning. Wishfully expecting a great leap in agricultural productivity from collectivization, the Chinese government accelerated its aggressive industrialization timetable. Grain output fell sharply as the government diverted agricultural resources to industry and imposed an excessive grain procurement burden on peasants, leaving them with insufficient calories to sustain labor productivity. Our analysis shows that 61 percent of the decline in output is attributable to the policies of resource diversion and excessive procurement.