Knowledge that Transforms

We measure college graduate quality—the average human capital of a college’s graduates—for graduates from 2,800 colleges in 48 countries. Graduates of colleges in the richest countries have 50% more human capital than graduates of colleges in the poorest countries. Migration reinforces these differences: emigrants from poorer countries are highly positively selected on human capital. Finally, we show that these stocks and flows matter for growth and development by showing that college graduate quality predicts the share of a college’s students who become inventors, engage in entrepreneurship, and become top executives both within and across countries.

We develop a state-space model with a transition equation that takes the form of a functional vector autoregression (VAR) and stacks macroeconomic aggregates and a cross-sectional density. The measurement equation captures the error in estimating log densities from repeated cross-sectional samples. The log densities and their transition kernels are approximated by sieves, which leads to a finite-dimensional VAR for macroeconomic aggregates and sieve coefficients. With this model, we study the dynamics of technology shocks, GDP (gross domestic product), employment, and the earnings distribution. We find that spillovers between aggregate and distributional dynamics are generally small, that a positive technology shock tends to decrease inequality, and that a shock that raises earnings inequality leads to a small and insignificant GDP response.

Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society’s choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of heterogeneous individuals. We define and characterize the Bayes welfare set, consisting of the population’s utility profiles that are feasible under some information policy. The Pareto frontier of this set can be recovered by a series of standard Bayesian persuasion problems. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an information policy exists that Pareto dominates the no-information policy. We illustrate our results with applications to data leakage, price discrimination, and credit ratings.

“Big G” typically refers to aggregate government spending on a homogeneous good. We confront this notion with five facts for the universe of federal purchases. First, they are volatile and account for the largest part of the short-run variation in total spending. Second, the origin of their variation is granular. Third, purchases are subject to procurement and bidding. Fourth, they are concentrated in long-term contracts. Fifth, their composition is biased toward sectors in which private sector prices are sticky. We develop a two-sector New Keynesian model consistent with these facts and find where the government spends is key for aggregate effects.

We provide an abstract model of the interaction between culture and political institutions. The model is designed to study the political economy of elites and civil society on the determination of long-run socioeconomic activity. We characterize conditions such that the cultural traits of elites and civil society and the institutions determining their relative political power complement (substitute) each other, giving rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies (dampens) their combined ability to spur socioeconomic activity. We show how the joint dynamics may display hysteresis and oscillations, depending on the form of the interaction between elites and civil society.

Opioid mortality increases have been linked to both lax and restrictive opioid prescription regulations. Modeling choice between prescription and illicitly manufactured opioid sources helps reconcile the apparently contradictory empirical findings. It also identifies groups responding opposite of the average and applies previous studies to new supply conditions. Organized around the two supply channels, a policy database is assembled that reveals distinct pricing phases during 1999–2021. Consistent with the model, during the later phases the relationship between the opioid fatality rate (measured from death certificates) and its composition changes sign, minors’ fatality rates trend opposite of adults’, and the black-white gap changes sign.

Globally, access to preschool has increased dramatically but its quality is often poor. We evaluate two interventions aimed at improving the quality of public preschools in Colombia. The first, designed by the government and rolled-out nationwide, provided preschools with significant extra funding, mainly earmarked for hiring teaching assistants (TAs). The second, for a small additional cost, also offered training for existing teachers. We show that the first intervention did not improve child development, while the second led to significant improvements in children’s cognitive development, especially for those from more disadvantaged backgrounds. We argue these dramatic differences can be explained by the two interventions having different impacts on teachers’ behavior. The first led teachers to reduce the time they spent in the classroom, including on learning activities. The addition of the training offset this adverse effect of TA provision on teachers’ learning activities and improved the quality of teaching.

We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants.

This paper extends a canonical model of intergenerational human capital investment to a geographic context to study the role of migration in influencing income mobility in the United States. The main result is that migration is considerably influential in shaping the high rates of economic mobility observed among children from low-wage areas, with human capital investment behavioral responses being important to consider. Equalizing school quality across locations does more to reduce interstate inequality in income mobility than equalizing skill prices, and policies that attempt to decrease human capital flight from low-wage areas via cash transfers are unlikely to be cost-effective.

We empirically document two adjustment margins that are usually absent from the predominant “bank balance sheet lending” view of financial intermediation. For the shadow bank substitution margin, shadow banks substitute for traditional banks among loans that are easily sold. For the balance sheet retention margin, banks switch between balance sheet lending and selling loans based on their balance sheet strength. Estimates from a structural model show that these margins significantly shape policy responses, dampening the effect of capital requirements on lending whose costs are borne by wealthier borrowers. Secondary-market disruptions such as quantitative easing have significantly larger impacts on lending than capital requirements.