Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate. We call this frictions. We solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow. The matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns. We argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the Beveridge curve.

Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, if the relationship lender needs funds before the loan matures, she may demand to liquidate early, or require a return premium, when she lends directly. Borrowers also risk losing funding. The costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile capital structure, subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from depositors' liquidity needs. Stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, narrow banking, and suspension of convertibility, may reduce liquidity creation.

This paper explores the ability of conditional versions of the CAPM and the consumption CAPMjointly the (C)CAPMto explain the cross section of average stock returns. Central to our approach is the use of the log consumptionwealth ratio as a conditioning variable. We demonstrate that such conditional models perform far better than unconditional specifications and about as well as the Fama-French three-factor model on portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market characteristics. The conditional consumption CAPM can account for the difference in returns between low-book-to-market and high-book-to-market portfolios and exhibits little evidence of residual size or book-to-market effects

Using equipment‐level data from aerospace plants that closed during the 1990s, this paper studies the process of moving installed physical capital to a new use. The analysis yields three results that suggest significant sectoral specificity of physical capital and substantial costs of redeploying the capital. First, other aerospace companies are overrepresented among buyers of the used capital relative to their representation in the market for new investment goods. Second, even after age‐related depreciation is taken into account, capital sells for a substantial discount relative to replacement cost; the more specialized the type of capital, the greater the discount. Yet, capital sold to other aerospace firms fetches a higher price than capital sold to industry outsiders. Finally, the process of winding down operations and selling the equipment takes several years

This paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. The expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. We articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. We present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis

An informed advisor wishes to convey her valuable information to an uninformed decision maker with identical preferences. Thus she has a current incentive to truthfully reveal her information. But if the decision maker thinks that the advisor might be biased in favor of one decision and the advisor does not wish to be thought to be biased, the advisor has a reputational incentive to lie. If the advisor is sufficiently concerned about her reputation, no information is conveyed in equilibrium. In a repeated version of this game, the advisor will care (instrumentally) about her reputation simply because she wants her valuable and unbiased advice to have an impact on future decisions. I.

We present a methodology for measuring the risks posed by drinking drivers that relies solely on readily available data on fatal crashes. The key to our identification strategy is a hidden richness inherent in two‐car crashes. Drivers with alcohol in their blood are seven times more likely to cause a fatal crash; legally drunk drivers pose a risk 13 times greater than sober drivers. The externality per mile driven by a drunk driver is at least 30 cents. At current enforcement rates the punishment per arrest for drunk driving that internalizes this externality would be equivalent to a fine of $8,000.

This paper presents a theory of rent seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members. The two key assumptions are constraints on lump‐sum transfers from poorer members and disproportionate control rights wielded by wealthier members. Transfers of rents to the latter are achieved by depressing prices paid for inputs supplied by members and diverting resulting retained earnings. The theory predicts that increased heterogeneity of landholdings in the local area causes increased inefficiency by inducing a lower input price and a lower level of installed crushing capacity. Predictions concerning the effect of the distribution of local landownership on sugarcane price, capacity levels, and participation rates of different classes of farmers are confirmed by data from nearly 100 sugar cooperatives in the Indian state of Maharashtra over the period 1971–93