This paper presents a model and some highly tentative empirical estimates of the social costs of monopoly and monopoly-inducing regulation in the United States. Unlike the previous studies, it assumes that competition to obtain a monopoly results in the transformation of expected monopoly profits into social costs. A major conclusion is that public regulation is probably a larger source of social costs than private monopoly. The implications of the analysis for several public policy issues, such as appropriate policy toward mergers and price discrimination, are also discussed.

Empirical studies of covered interest arbitrage suggest that the parity condition is not always satisfied and thus implying unexploited profit opportunities. This paper provides a procedure for estimating transaction costs in the markets for foreign exchange and for securities. Allowance for these costs accounts for most of the apparent profit opportunities. It is shown that in addition to transaction costs, demand and supply elasticities in the various markets and lags in executing arbitrage can account for all of the apparent profit opportunities. It is concluded that empirical data are consistent with the interest parity theory and that covered interest arbitrage does not entail unexploited profit opportunities.

A reduced-form equation relating length of "formal schooling" to market, endowment, and ability parameters was derived for a life-cycle human capital accumulation model with alternative assumptions: (a) equal borrowing and lending rates and (b) no loans for human capital investment. Length of "formal schooling" increases when loans are unavailable. For both cases, length of "formal schooling" varies directly with length of work life, a Hicks-neutral "ability" index, and the ratio of the human capital rental rate to the price of associated inputs, and varies inversely with the discount rate, deterioration rate, and initial human capital stock.

A three-sector general equilibrium model is employed to analyze the consequences of changes in aggregate demand, union power, workers' time horizons, and labor force size on "unionized" industries, industries with competitive labor markets,and unemployment. Workers are "voluntarily" unemployed while searching for jobs,attempting to arbitrage a wage gap created by partial "unionization." Many reduced-form elasticities are ambiguous in algebraic sign. For example, decreased aggregate demand may increase employment in industries with competitive labor markets. However, a larger and younger work force with enhanced aspirations for higher-paying jobs will have unambiguously higher unemployment.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at