We examine the quantitative impact of policy-induced changes in firms’ innovative investment on growth in aggregate productivity and output in a model that nests several of the canonical models. We isolate two statistics, the impact elasticity of aggregate productivity growth with respect to aggregate innovative investment and the degree of intertemporal knowledge spillovers in research, that shape the model’s predicted dynamic response to a change in the innovation intensity of the economy. Given measures of these statistics, there is only modest scope for increasing aggregate productivity and output over a 20-year horizon with uniform innovation subsidies to firms’ investments in innovation of a reasonable magnitude, but the welfare gains may be substantial.

What are the consequences of international trade on the skill premium? We incorporate skill-intensity differences across firms and sectors into a standard model of international trade. Reductions in trade costs reallocate factors toward a country's comparative advantage sectors, increasing the skill premium in countries with a comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors and decreasing it elsewhere. Reductions in trade costs also reallocate factors toward more productive and skill-intensive firms within sectors and toward skill-intensive sectors in all countries, increasing the skill premium in all countries. Quantitatively, we find that trade liberalization increases the skill premium in almost all countries.

We present a general equilibrium model of the decisions of firms to innovate and to engage in international trade. We use the model to analyze the impact of a reduction in international trade costs on firms ’ process and product innovative activity. We first show analytically that if all firms export with equal intensity, then a reduction in international trade costs has no impact at all, in steady-state, on firms ’ investments in process innovation. We then show that if only a subset of firms export, a decline in marginal trade costs raises process innovation in exporting firms relative to that of non-exporting firms. This reallocation of process innovation reinforces existing patterns of comparative advantage, and leads to an amplified response of trade volumes and output over time. In a quantitative version of the model, we show that the increase in process innovation is largely offset by a decline in product innovation. We find that, even if process innovation is very elastic and leads to a large dynamic response of trade, output, consumption, and the firm size distribution, the dynamic welfare gains are very similar to those in a model with inelastic process innovation.

In this paper we argue that the primary force behind the large drop in real exchange rates that occurs after large devaluations is the slow adjustment in the prices of nontradable goods and services. Our empirical analysis uses data from five large devaluation episodes: Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994), and Thailand (1997). We conduct a detailed analysis of the Argentinian case using disaggregated consumer price index data, data from our own survey of prices in Buenos Aires, and scanner data from supermarkets. We assess the robustness of our findings by studying large real exchange rate appreciations, medium devaluations, and small exchange rate movements.