The problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered. Individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned. A set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested. It is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem. Both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited. The procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well. It results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and "consumer surplus" is maximized; its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria.

The problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered. Individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned. A set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested. It is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem. Both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited. The procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well. It results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and "consumer surplus" is maximized; its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria.

In this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption-production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles. Our explanation is entirely consistent with (i) rational expectations, (ii) complete current information, (iii) stable preferences, (iv) no technological change, (v) no long-lived commodities, (vi) no frictions or adjustment costs, (vii) no government, (viii) no money, and (ix) no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment. We also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind. The time-series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles. Although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles, we believe that it provides a useful, well-defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors (e.g., monetary disturbances) that we have deliberately ignored.

A discretionary policymaker can create surprise inflation, which may reduce employment and raise government revenue. But when people understand the policymaker's objectives, these surprises cannot occur systematically. In equilibrium people form expectations rationally and the policymaker optimizes in each period, subject to the way that people form expectations. Then, we find that (1) the rates of monetary growth and inflation are excessive; (2) these rates depend on the slope of Phillips curve, the natural unemployment rate, and other variables that affect the benefits and costs from inflation; (3) the monetary authority behaves countercyclically; and (4) unemployment is independent of money policy. Outcomes improve if rules commit future policy choices in the appropriate manner. The value of these commitments--which amount to long-term contracts between the government and the private sector--underlies the argument for rules over discretion.

In this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption-production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles. Our explanation is entirely consistent with (i) rational expectations, (ii) complete current information, (iii) stable preferences, (iv) no technological change, (v) no long-lived commodities, (vi) no frictions or adjustment costs, (vii) no government, (viii) no money, and (ix) no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment. We also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind. The time-series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles. Although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles, we believe that it provides a useful, well-defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors (e.g., monetary disturbances) that we have deliberately ignored.

Natural-rate models suggest that the systematic parts of monetary policy will not have important consequences for the business cycle. Nevertheless, we often observe high and variable rates of monetary growth, and a tendency for monetary authorities to pursue countercyclical policies. This behavior is shown to be consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium in a discretionary environment where the policymaker pursues a "reasonable" objective, but where precommitments on monetary growth are precluded. At each point in time, the policymaker optimizes subject to given inflationary expectations, which determine a Phillips Curve-type tradeoff between monetary growth/inflation and unemployment. Inflationary expectations are formed with the knowledge that policymakers will be in this situation. Accordingly, equilibrium excludes systematic deviations between actual and expected inflation, which means that the equilibrium unemployment rate ends up independent of "policy" in our model. However, the equilibrium rates of monetary growth/inflation depend on various parameters, including the slope of the Phillips Curve, the costs attached to unemployment versus inflation, and the level of the natural unemployment rate. The monetary authority determines an average inflation rate that is "excessive, " and also tends to behave countercyclically. Outcomes are shown to improve if a costlessly operating rule is implemented in order to precomrnit future policy choices in the appropriate manner. The value of these precommitments -- that is, of long-term agreements between the government and the private sector -- underlies the argument for rules over discretion. Discretion is the sub-set of rules that provides no guarantees about the government's future behavior.