A self-interest explanation is presented for opposition by some farm groups to futures markets. During the twenties and thirties political opposition to futures markets was greater in the grain-producing states. The opposition was centered in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and a few other states. The line elevator companies were prominent in these states and not others and used futures prices to facilitate a buying cartel. Futures prices were used to derive a suggested buying price for elevator purchases in each local market. The political opposition to futures by farmers was designed to raise the cost of operating local cartels. Political opposition was greater and gross profit margins of elevators were higher in states with line elevators.

A self-interest explanation is presented for opposition by some farm groups to futures markets. During the twenties and thirties political opposition to futures markets was greater in the grain-producing states. The opposition was centered in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and a few other states. The line elevator companies were prominent in these states and not others and used futures prices to facilitate a buying cartel. Futures prices were used to derive a suggested buying price for elevator purchases in each local market. The political opposition to futures by farmers was designed to raise the cost of operating local cartels. Political opposition was greater and gross profit margins of elevators were higher in states with line elevators.

In his well-known analysis of the national debt, Robert Barro introduced the notion of a "dynastic family." This notion has since become a standard research tool, particularly in the areas of public finance and macroeconomics. In this paper, we critique the assumptions on which the dynastic model is predicated and argue that this framework is not a suitable abstraction in contexts in which the objective is to analyze the effects of public policies. We reach this conclusion by formally considering a world in which each generation consists of a large number of distinct individuals as opposed to one representative individual. We point out that family linkages form complex networks, in which each individual may belong to many dynastic groupings. The resulting proliferation of linkages between families gives rise to a host of neutrality results, including the irrelevance of all public redistributions, distortionary taxes, and prices. Since these results are not at all descriptive of the real world, we conclude that, in some fundamental sense, the world is not even approximately dynastic. These observations call into question all policy- related results based on the dynastic framework, including the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.

This paper contributes a new element to the explanation of the Gibson paradox, the puzzling correlation between interest rates and the price level seen during the gold standard period. A shock that raises the underlying real rate of return in the economy reduces the equilibrium relative price of gold and, with the nominal price of gold pegged by the authorities, must raise the price level. The mechanism involves the allocation of gold between monetary and nonmonetary uses. Our explanation helps to resolve some important anomalies in previous work and is supported by empirical evidence along a number of dimensions.

This paper contributes a new element to the explanation of the Gibson paradox, the puzzling correlation between interest rates and the price level seen during the gold standard period. A shock that raises the underlying real rate of return in the economy reduces the equilibrium relative price of gold and, with the nominal price of gold pegged by the authorities, must raise the price level. The mechanism involves the allocation of gold between monetary and nonmonetary uses. Our explanation helps to resolve some important anomalies in previous work and is supported by empirical evidence along a number of dimensions.

In his well-known analysis of the national debt, Robert Barro introduced the notion of a "dynastic family." This notion has since become a standard research tool, particularly in the areas of public finance and macroeconomics. In this paper, we critique the assumptions upon which the dynastic model is predicated, and argue that this framework is not a suitable abstraction In contexts where the objective is to analyze the effects of public policies. We reach this conclusion by formally considering a world in which each generation consists of a large number of distinct individuals, as opposed to one representative individual. We point out that family linkages form complex networks, in which each individual may belong to many dynastic groupings. The resulting proliferation of linkages between families gives rise to a host of neutrality results, including the irrelevance of all public redistributions, distortionary taxes, and prices. Since these results are not at all descriptive of the real world, we conclude that, in some fundamental sense, the world is not even approximately dynastic. These observations call into question all policy related results based on the dynastic framework, including the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.