If the choice of domestic versus foreign money and capital market instruments was on the basis of covered yields, funds would universally flow in one direction, from the smallest incentive, to the instruments of highest yields. This paper shows the consequences of different rates of taxation on interest and on exchange gains, the two components of foreign yields. By reference to the U.S.-Canadian situation it is shown how we might observe taxpayers in both countries simultaneously buying securities of the other, or simultaneously buying their own domestic securities. It is also shown how we might find taxpayers of both countries buying the securities with the lower pretax yields.

[In fact, share-farmed lands yield as much as rented or owner-cultivated lands. In traditional theory, share-farmed lands yield less, for share tenants stint their efforts. This article shows that economists' standard assumptions about a market equilibrium reconcile theory with fact: when contracts are enforced, share farmers labor as diligently as others. Evidence is advanced that gain from the joining of tenant and landlord interests, not gain from the dispersion of agricultural risk, is the impetus to share tenancy.]

If the choice of domestic versus foreign money and capital market instruments was on the basis of covered yields, funds would universally flow in one direction, from the smallest incentive, to the instruments of highest yields. This paper shows the consequences of different rates of taxation on interest and on exchange gains, the two components of foreign yields. By reference to the U.S.-Canadian situation it is shown how we might observe taxpayers in both countries simultaneously buying securities of the other, or simultaneously buying their own domestic securities. It is also shown how we might find taxpayers of both countries buying the securities with the lower pretax yields.

In fact, share-farmed lands yield as much as rented or owner-cultivated lands. In traditional theory, share-farmed lands yield less, for share tenants stint their efforts. This article shows that economists' standard assumptions about a market equilibrium reconcile theory with fact: when contracts are enforced, share farmers labor as diligently as others. Evidence is advanced that gain from the joining of tenant and landlord interests, not gain from the dispersion of agricultural risk, is the impetus to share tenancy.

Contrary to popular opinion, the diversion of traffic from railroads to motor carriers has not been the result of minimum rate regulation. The idea that there is a large amount of misallocated traffic is based on the widespread but faulty method of analyzing intermodal competition by means of a simple cost comparison. The paper uses modal split analysis to show that the welfare gain accompanying minimum rate regulation will be modest. The welfare effects of transport controls other than minimum rate regulations are likely to be far more serious.

[An embargo probability leads to private adjustments to curtail consumption and expand production, raising marginal value of consumption less than of production. If there are unemployment or foreign policy externalities, there is an optimal tariff which is proportional to foreign dependence, is inversely proportional to elasticity of external embargo loss, varies directly with embargo probability, and depends more complexly on other parameters. Stockpiling should limit embargo price rise to unit cost of storage divided by embargo frequency. With low embargo frequency, the price rise based on the stockpiling criterion may be greater than with no stockpiling. is then unwarranted.]

An embargo probability leads to private adjustments to curtail consumption and expand production, raising marginal value of consumption less than of production. If there are unemployment or foreign policy externalities, there is an optimal tariff which is proportional to foreign dependence, is inversely proportional to elasticity of external embargo loss, varies directly with embargo probability, and depends more complexly on other parameters. Stockpiling should limit embargo price rise to unit cost of storage divided by embargo frequency. With low embargo frequency, the price rise based on the stockpiling criterion may be greater than with no stockpiling. is then unwarranted.

Contrary to popular opinion, the diversion of traffic from railroads to motor carriers has not been the result of minimum rate regulation. The idea that there is a large amount of misallocated traffic is based on the widespread but faulty method of analyzing intermodal competition by means of a simple cost comparison. The paper uses modal split analysis to show that the welfare gain accompanying minimum rate regulation will be modest. The welfare effects of transport controls other than minimum rate regulations are likely to be far more serious.