This paper focuses on the welfare effects of output instability and its elimination. Assuming Muthian rationality, risk neutrality, and lagged production response, I show how output instability affects the long-run production incentive. The gains and losses from the elimination of output disturbances ("ideal stabilization") are evaluated, and simple general conditions are derived which determine whether producers or consumers can expect to gain or lose from such stabilization. The distribution of the gains is generally more evenhanded than indicated in previous expectational models of price stabilization, which can be interpreted as special cases of this model.

This paper examines the rules governing the optimal distribution of educational resources originally developed by Arrow, in the context of a model in which some attempt is made to provide a rationale for government expenditure. Thus while there is a private market providing a perfect substitute for government education, if the government cannot adopt the lump-sum taxation which would make exclusive reliance on the private market optimal, but has to rely on an income tax for redistribution, then an optimally chosen scheme of educational provision by the government will powerfully reinforce the redistributive effect of income tax.

This paper investigates the economics of the transition of land from rural to urban use. A simple model is employed to examine the developer's problem: When and at what destiny should vacant land be developed to maximize the present value of the Land? A series of rules emerges from the analysis to the timing and density of new development. In the latter half of the paper, the rules are tested against recent Canadian experience and peform well.

This paper investigates the economics of the transition of land from rural to urban use. A simple model is employed to examine the developer's problem: When and at what destiny should vacant land be developed to maximize the present value of the Land? A series of rules emerges from the analysis to the timing and density of new development. In the latter half of the paper, the rules are tested against recent Canadian experience and peform well.

This paper focuses on the welfare effects of output instability and its elimination. Assuming Muthian rationality, risk neutrality, and lagged production response, I show how output instability affects the long-run production incentive. The gains and losses from the elimination of output disturbances ("ideal stabilization") are evaluated, and simple general conditions are derived which determine whether producers or consumers can expect to gain or lose from such stabilization. The distribution of the gains is generally more evenhanded than indicated in previous expectational models of price stabilization, which can be interpreted as special cases of this model.

This paper examines the rules governing the optimal distribution of educational resources originally developed by Arrow, in the context of a model in which some attempt is made to provide a rationale for government expenditure. Thus while there is a private market providing a perfect substitute for government education, if the government cannot adopt the lump-sum taxation which would make exclusive reliance on the private market optimal, but has to rely on an income tax for redistribution, then an optimally chosen scheme of educational provision by the government will powerfully reinforce the redistributive effect of income tax.