Over last two decades punitiveness of juvenile justice system has declined substantially relative adult courts. During that same time period juvenile violent rates have grown almost twice as quickly as adult crime rates. This paper examines degree to which those two empirical observations are related, finding that changes in relative punishments can account for 60 percent of differential growth rates in juvenile and adult violent between 1978 and 1993. Juvenile offenders appear be at least as responsive sanctions as adults. Moreover, sharp changes in criminal involvement with transition from juvenile adult court suggest that deterrence, rather than simply incapacitation important role. There does not, however, appear be a strong relationship between the punitiveness of juvenile justice system that a cohort faces and extent of involvement for that cohort later in life.

When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price‐taking firms may offer advance‐purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance‐purchase sales are made to low‐valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second‐degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power.

In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive, or efficiency‐enhancing, depending on the setting. More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in noncoincident markets (i. e., markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting in which common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing. We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.