In this paper, I show the existence of stationary rational expectations equilibria in a simple two-island, overlapping generations model of the type first considered by Lucas, in which all uncertainty is endogenous. The result is obtained by first constructing "sunspot" equilibria on each island separately and then using the equilibrium pricing equations to eliminate the sunspot variable. In the resulting equilibrium, each island's prices serve as the sunspot for the other island. The constructed equilibrium is nontrivially stochastic.

In this paper, I show the existence of stationary rational expectations equilibria in a simple two-island, overlapping generations model of the type first considered by Lucas, in which all uncertainty is endogenous. The result is obtained by first constructing "sunspot" equilibria on each island separately and then using the equilibrium pricing equations to eliminate the sunspot variable. In the resulting equilibrium, each island's prices serve as the sunspot for the other island. The constructed equilibrium is nontrivially stochastic.

We analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good. Unlike previous analyses, we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum. None of the main conclusions of the literature on durable-goods monopoly survives this change in assumption. Coase's conjecture that a durable-goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous-time limit, Bulow's proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it, and Stokey's proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite. Thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers--so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts--has proved misleading in the context of durable-goods monopoly.

We analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good. Unlike previous analyses, we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum. None of the main conclusions of the literature on durable-goods monopoly survives this change in assumption. Coase's conjecture that a durable-goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous-time limit, Bulow's proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it, and Stokey's proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite. Thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers--so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts--has proved misleading in the context of durable-goods monopoly.