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Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations

Journal of Political Economy 2006 114(2), 366-402
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M‐form and U‐form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U‐form, the M‐form organization achieves better coordination in “attribute matching” but suffers from coordination in “attribute compatibility” and less gains in specialization. The distinctive advantage of the M‐form is its flexibility in choosing between small‐scale and full‐scale experimentation.

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Journal of Political Economy 2000 108(6), 1121-1161 open access
We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to compare the public …nance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. Compared to a parliamentary system, a presidentialcongressional system has less incentives for legislative cohesion, but has a clearer separation of powers. These features make public …nance outcomes radically di¤erent in the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more rents to politicians and a higher tax burden, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians and a smaller size of government. JEL classi…cation: H00, D72, D78.

Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual‐Track Approach to Transition

Journal of Political Economy 2000 108(1), 120-143
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform. The model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving Pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency. We examine how the dual‐track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in China.