The paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation. Against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects, it is shown that the temporary policy does and, furthermore, that the real effects tend to become bigger (in absolute value) as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened. The central discussion is carried out in terms of a one-good, cash-in-advance model, with perfect capital mobility and Ramsey-type consumers. Results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity; the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed.

The paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation. Against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects, it is shown that the temporary policy does and, furthermore, that the real effects tend to become bigger (in absolute value) as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened. The central discussion is carried out in terms of a one-good, cash-in-advance model, with perfect capital mobility and Ramsey-type consumers. Results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity; the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed.

Labor allocation and wage-scale formation are studied in the context of competitive hierarchic firms. We show that (1) the wage per effective laborer and his quality increase with the hierarchical position of the employee, and (2) up to a point, the imposition of a minimum wage for production labor increases the quality and quantity of production workers and reduces the wage, quality, and number of supervisors. These results help to explain the skewness of income distribution, and the wage differentials across layers which are inexplicable in terms of differences in labor quality and difficulty of tasks.

Labor allocation and wage-scale formation are studied in the context of competitive hierarchic firms. We show that (1) the wage per effective laborer and his quality increase with the hierarchical position of the employee, and (2) up to a point, the imposition of a minimum wage for production labor increases the quality and quantity of production workers and reduces the wage, quality, and number of supervisors. These results help to explain the skewness of income distribution, and the wage differentials across layers which are inexplicable in terms of differences in labor quality and difficulty of tasks.

We show that limitation of firm size caused by loss of control across hierarchic levels depends crucially on the nature of the supervision process. If the employees cannot identify the times at which their performance is monitored, there is no limit imposed on the firm size by the heights of the hierarchical structure. "Loss of control" may impose such a limit if the employees are aware of the times at which they are being monitored. The analysis also shows the rationale for hierarchical wage differentials for essentially identical employees.

We show that limitation of firm size caused by loss of control across hierarchic levels depends crucially on the nature of the supervision process. If the employees cannot identify the times at which their performance is monitored, there is no limit imposed on the firm size by the heights of the hierarchical structure. "Loss of control" may impose such a limit if the employees are aware of the times at which they are being monitored. The analysis also shows the rationale for hierarchical wage differentials for essentially identical employees.

This paper analyzes a two-sector model of exchange rate determination for a mall open economy with flexible prices. Residents are assumed to hold both domestic and foreign currency and to have rational expectations. The model satisfies the homogeneity postulate but it is shown that an increase in the rate of expansions of money supply leads to an instantaneous deterioration of the real exchange rate. In the long run, however, the latter moves back to its previous level.

This paper analyzes a two-sector model of exchange rate determination for a mall open economy with flexible prices. Residents are assumed to hold both domestic and foreign currency and to have rational expectations. The model satisfies the homogeneity postulate but it is shown that an increase in the rate of expansions of money supply leads to an instantaneous deterioration of the real exchange rate. In the long run, however, the latter moves back to its previous level.