This article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in Florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information. The main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data. The article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms, such as imposing limits on contingency fees and caps on jury awards.

We consider a dynamic game of electoral competition with adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We show that this dynamic game can be estimated using a flexible maximum likelihood estimator. We implement the estimator using data from recent mayoral elections in large US cities with binding two-term limits. Our empirical findings suggest that there are large differences in performance among different types of mayors. We find an economically important degree of policy responsiveness, with effort accounting for a larger fraction of the total effect than selection. Finally, we evaluate several institutional reforms that promise to increase policy responsiveness.

Research over the past several years has led to the development of models characterizing equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions. An important insight from these models is that plausible single‐crossing assumptions about preferences generate strong predictions about the equilibrium distribution of households across communities. To date, these predictions have not subjected to formal empirical tests. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated approach for testing predictions from this class of models. We first test conditions for locational equilibrium implied by these models. In particular, we test predictions about the distribution of households by income across communities. We then test the models' predictions about the relationships among loclational equilibrium conditions, housing markets, and housing prices. By drawing inferences from a structural general equilibrium model, the paper offers a unified treatment of theory and empirical testing.

Minority and disadvantaged students are typically underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. Urban school districts may set different referral and admission thresholds based on income and race (affirmative action), and they may exploit differences in achievement relative to ability across race and income groups (profiling). We develop and estimate a model that provides a unified treatment of affirmative action and profiling. We find profiling by race and income and affirmative action for low-income students. Counterfactual analysis reveals that these policies achieve more than 80 percent of African American enrollment that could be attained by race-based affirmative action.

We provide a new estimator for a broad class of equilibrium models of metropolitan housing markets with housing differentiated by quality. Quality is a latent variable that captures all features of a dwelling and its environment. We estimate the model for Chicago and New York, obtaining hedonic housing price functions for each quality level for each metropolitan area, stocks of each quality, and compensating variations required for a household of a given income in Chicago to be equally well off in New York.