This paper joins a few very recent attempts to analyze migration in the awareness of the family context. In contrast to most of them, my focus is exclusively on the family context. The paper defines family ties relevant to migration decisions and explains their effects on the probability of migration, on consequent changes in employment and earnings of family members, as well as on family integrity itself. Hopefully, the paper provides material for a missing chapter on family economics as well as an addition to the economics of labor supply arid of human capital formation.

An economic definition of family ties relevant to migration decisions leads to the exploration of their effects on the probability of migration, on consequent changes in employment and earnings of family members, and on family stability. It is shown that ties represent negative "personal" externalities which are usually, but not always, internalized by the family. ties tend to deter migration, to reduce the employment and earnings of migrating wives, and to increase the employment and earnings of their husbands. The growth of labor market attachment of women creates an increase in migration ties, which both deters migration and contributes to marital instability. Conversely, growing marital instability stimulates migration and reinforces the upward trends in women's labor force participation.

Empirical investigation of employment effects of minimum wage legislation is a subject of continuing interest, judging by a growing number of studies. The older studies were concerned mainly with changes in employment in low-wage industries. In the more recent work, attention has shifted to effects on unemployment in low-wage demographic groups, such as teenagers. Despite the statistical difference there is no apparent recognition of a conceptual as well as substantive distinction between minimum wage effects on employment and those on unemployment. The purpose of this paper is to explore the analytical distinction between employment and unemployment effects in the hope of providing some understanding of the observations. Though related empirical work is far from being definitive the findings appear to be informative.

It has long been recognized that consumption behavior represents mainly joint household or family decisions rather than separate decisions of family members. Accordingly, the observational units in consumption surveys are "consumer units," that is, households in which income is largely pooled and consumption largely shared. More recent is the recognition that an individual's use of time, and particularly the allocation of time between market and nonmarket activities, is also best understood within the context of the family as a matter of interdependence with needs, activities, and characteristics of other family members. More generally, the family is viewed as an economic unit which shares consumption and allocates production at home and in the market as well as the investments in physical and human capital of its members. In this view, the behavior of the family unit implies a division of labor within it. Broadly speaking, this division of labor or "differentiation of roles" emerges because the attempts to promote family life are necessarily constrained by complementarity and substitution relations in the household production process and by comparative