This paper examines the role of marital connections in models of intertemporal household behavior. Recent work by Bernheim and Bagwell implies that such connections might vastly expand the scope of neutrality results. The present work studies several formulations including not only marriage but also descriptions of how people choose spouses. Purposeful choices lead to assortative mating. All versions of the framework tend to lead away from cross-sectional neutrality results. The analysis suggests that one may be able to derive a solution for a parthenogenetic model and then interpret it as consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior in a world with marriage.

The literature evaluating tax changes within an intertemporal general equilibrium framework subdivides into representative agent and overlapping generations formulations. Papers in the former class have developed techniques analogous to those routine for static analyses. I show that the same general approach works for the overlapping generations model. The context is the system from Auerbach and Kotlikoff's Dynamic Fiscal Policy. The proposed methodology allows one to examine stability and determinancy issues for the model, it deals precisely with small policy changes, and it can easily handle bundles of changes. I present comparative static results for comparison with existing work.

To offer a possible interpretation for recent empirical findings on earnings growth, this paper constructs a simple model with endogenous human capital investment, a distribution of natural abilities, and unbiased technological progress. The model predicts that in the long run, average earnings within any education group will grow more slowly than average wages overall. It also predicts that average earnings in high‐education groups ultimately will rise relative to average earnings in low‐education groups. In the model, these processes do not imply secular increases in the degree of inequality in the overall cross‐sectional distribution of earnings.

This paper examines the role of marital connections in models of intertemporal household behavior. Recent work by Bernheim and Bagwell implies that such connections might vastly expand the scope of neutrality results. The present work studies several formulations including not only marriage but also descriptions of how people choose spouses. Purposeful choices lead to assortative mating. All versions of the framework tend to lead away from cross-sectional neutrality results. The analysis suggests that one may be able to derive a solution for a parthenogenetic model and then interpret it as consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior in a world with marriage.

The literature evaluating tax changes within an intertemporal general equilibrium framework subdivides into representative agent and overlapping generations formulations. Papers in the former class have developed techniques analogous to those routine for static analyses. I show that the same general approach works for the overlapping generations model. The context is the system from Auerbach and Kotlikoff's Dynamic Fiscal Policy. The proposed methodology allows one to examine stability and determinancy issues for the model, it deals precisely with small policy changes, and it can easily handle bundles of changes. I present comparative static results for comparison with existing work.