Though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment, compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find. We collected observations on two types of firms--conventional proprietorships and worker-owned cooperatives--operating in the same industry, in the same location, and at the same period of time. We compare the firms' reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization.

Two models of wage and employment determination in unionized markets are routinely exposited. According to one, wage and employment outcomes are on the firm's labor demand curve; according to the other, wages and employment are on the partie' contract curve. This paper spells out an empirical procedure that discriminates between these two models and applies this procedure to the particular case of the newspaper industry and the International Typographical Union. The labor demand curve model is inconsistent with our data, while the contract curve model comes closer to describing our observations.

The wages and employment of typographers are examined to see whether they can be usefully characterized as the outcome of a process by which the union maximizes an objective function containing wages and employment and is constrained by a trade-off between these two variables as represented by the employer's labor demand function. Our functional form assumptions permit investigation of some familiar special cases of union behavior. The parameter implications of both the wage bill maximization hypothesis and the rent maximization hypothesis provide inferior explanations of the movement of wages and employment of these workers compared with our more general formulation.

The wages and employment of typographers are examined to see whether they can be usefully characterized as the outcome of a process by which the union maximizes an objective function containing wages and employment and is constrained by a trade-off between these two variables as represented by the employer's labor demand function. Our functional form assumptions permit investigation of some familiar special cases of union behavior. The parameter implications of both the wage bill maximization hypothesis and the rent maximization hypothesis provide inferior explanations of the movement of wages and employment of these workers compared with our more general formulation.

Though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment, compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find. We collected observations on two types of firms--conventional proprietorships and worker-owned cooperatives--operating in the same industry, in the same location, and at the same period of time. We compare the firms' reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization.

Two models of wage and employment determination in unionized markets are routinely exposited. According to one, wage and employment outcomes are on the firm's labor demand curve; according to the other, wages and employment are on the partie' contract curve. This paper spells out an empirical procedure that discriminates between these two models and applies this procedure to the particular case of the newspaper industry and the International Typographical Union. The labor demand curve model is inconsistent with our data, while the contract curve model comes closer to describing our observations.