We document that countries partially default often and with varying intensity, resulting in lengthy episodes and hump-shaped patterns for partial default and debt. Default episodes lead to haircuts for lenders but not to reductions in debt, because the defaulted debt accumulates and borrowing continues. We present a theory of partial default rationalizing these patterns and the heterogeneity of partial default, and partial default’s comovements with spreads, debt, and output that are absent in standard sovereign default theory. We include policy counterfactuals in the form of pari passu and no-dilution clauses and debt-relief policies, and their welfare implications.

Global financial imbalances can result from financial integration when countries differ in financial markets development. Countries with more advanced financial markets accumulate foreign liabilities in a gradual, long-lasting process. Differences in financial development also affect the composition of foreign portfolios: countries with negative net foreign asset positions maintain positive net holdings of nondiversifiable equity and foreign direct investment. Three observations motivate our analysis: (1) financial development varies widely even among industrial countries, with the United States on top; (2) the secular decline in the U.S. net foreign asset position started in the early 1980s, together with a gradual process of international financial integration; (3) the portfolio composition of U.S. net foreign assets features increased holdings of risky assets and a large increase in debt.

We show that a theory of earnings and wealth inequality, based on the optimal choices of ex ante identical households that face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments of efficiency labor units, accounts for the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly.

In this paper we construct a stochastic overlapping-generations general equilibrium model in which households are subject to aggregate shocks that affect both wages and asset prices. We use a calibrated version of the model to quantify how the welfare costs of severe recessions are distributed across different household age groups. The model predicts that younger cohorts fare better than older cohorts when the equilibrium decline in asset prices is large relative to the decline in wages, as observed in the data. Asset price declines hurt the old, who rely on asset sales to finance consumption, but benefit the young, who purchase assets at depressed prices. In our preferred calibration, asset prices decline more than twice as much as wages, consistent with the experience of the US economy in the Great Recession. A model recession is approximately welfare-neutral for households in the 20-29 age group, but translates into a large welfare loss of around 10% of lifetime consumption for households aged 70 and over.