This paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable. Such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest: (1) hierarchical wage structures; (2) internal promotion; (3) wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity; (4) the variance of earnings increasing with experience; and (5) wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages.

This paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable. Such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest: (1) hierarchical wage structures; (2) internal promotion; (3) wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity; (4) the variance of earnings increasing with experience; and (5) wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages.

This paper investigates the use of futures prices in making production decisions. We derive a preference-independent production rule for firms that face both demand and production uncertainty. This rule is compared to a simple "marginal cost equals future price" rule, which previously has been suggested for firms with deterministic output. Data for agricultural producers are used to examine the importance of output uncertainty in the determination of the proper production rule. Our analysis suggests that for many crops the simple rule is sufficiently accurate to be a useful guide to production.

The substantial U.S. inflations of the 1970s led to some popular support for commodity-based money. Gold has had a special role in historical commodity-money schemes, and it emerged as a leading contender in recent discussions. In October 1980 Congress established the Gold Commission to study the possible remonetization of gold. In this paper we analyze some gold monetization schemes proposed to the commission. We find that the adoption of these proposals need not lead to the price-level stability their proponents seek. Even a well-designed commodity-money scheme is a foolproof inflation guard only when the scheme's permanence is guaranteed. Permanence may possibly be guaranteed by an underlying political economy that abhors inflation, but merely the enactment of a new ephemeral rule does not ensure permanence.