Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or not-for-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace.

The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender’s and receiver’s motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue‐relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.

The paper's main contribution is to provide a rational for advocacy. After observing that many organizations (corporations, judiciary, and the executive and legislative branches of government) use competition among enfranchised advocates of special interests to improve policy making, it argues that advocacy has two major benefits. First, the advocates' rewards closely track their pursuing several conflicting causes at one time. Second, advocacy enhances the integrity of decision making by creating strong incentives to appeal in case of an abusive decision. The paper also analyzes the costs of advocacy in terms of manipulation and garbling of information. It further shows that it may be costly for both the organization and interested parties themselves to let these parties plead their own causes instead of being represented. The paper concludes with two applications to comparative legal systems and to the organization of Congress and with suggestions for future research.