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Income Distributions in Two Experimental Economies

Journal of Political Economy 1977 85(6), 1259-1271
Data on individual labor earnings are reported from two experimental economies where the primary factors responsible for income differences were differences in tastes for market income versus leisure and differences in abilities working manual job tasks. Measured income dispersion under these conditions was strikingly similar to that in the United states and other market economies, indicating that these two factors alone are sufficient to generate such income differences. Further, in tests of the functional form of the distributions of income, the hypothesis of lognormality fit better than the hypothesis of normality, just as it does in national data.

Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior

Journal of Political Economy 1994 102(5), 975-1005
Selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria. This is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis. This paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best-response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic. The inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best-response outcomes.

Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior

Journal of Political Economy 1994 102(5), 975-1005
Selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria. This is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis. This paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best-response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic. The inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best-response outcomes.

Commodity-Choice Behavior with Pigeons as Subjects

Journal of Political Economy 1981 89(1), 67-91
Starting from an initial (baseline) budget line, income-compensated price changes always resulted in substitution effects consistent with the Slutsky-Hicks theory. This behavior cannot be explained by a simple random-behavior model. Similar changes in relative prices that did not originate from the initial (baseline) budget line resulted in "undersubstitution effects": The composition of consumption changed in the expected direction, but the magnitude of change was not large enough to be consistent with the initial commodity bundle chosen. These undersubstitution effects are not explainable by shifting preference patterns or anchoring effects found in inconsistent choice sequences with human subjects.

History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions

Journal of Political Economy 1992 100(2), 292-316
What causes individual suppliers to allocate goods in such a way that the aggregate allocation satisfies the law of one price? A satisfactory answer to this question must confront two related problems: Equal net prices at all allocations provide no information to suppliers about the quantity to deliver to a specific location, and strategic uncertainty makes an observed violation of the law of one price an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity. This paper develops a simple analytical framework to formalize these two problems, reviews some solutions found in the literature, and reports laboratory evidence on how people solve them. In addressing these issues, we focus on the role historical prices play in coordinating decentralized allocation decisions.

History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions

Journal of Political Economy 1992 100(2), 292-316
What causes individual suppliers to allocate goods in such a way that the aggregate allocation satisfies the law of one price? A satisfactory answer to this question must confront two related problems: Equal net prices at all allocations provide no information to suppliers about the quantity to deliver to a specific location, and strategic uncertainty makes an observed violation of the law of one price an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity. This paper develops a simple analytical framework to formalize these two problems, reviews some solutions found in the literature, and reports laboratory evidence on how people solve them. In addressing these issues, we focus on the role historical prices play in coordinating decentralized allocation decisions.

Income Distributions in Two Experimental Economies

Journal of Political Economy 1977 85(6), 1259-1271
Data on individual labor earnings are reported from two experimental economies where the primary factors responsible for income differences were differences in tastes for market income versus leisure and differences in abilities working manual job tasks. Measured income dispersion under these conditions was strikingly similar to that in the United states and other market economies, indicating that these two factors alone are sufficient to generate such income differences. Further, in tests of the functional form of the distributions of income, the hypothesis of lognormality fit better than the hypothesis of normality, just as it does in national data.

Commodity-Choice Behavior with Pigeons as Subjects

Journal of Political Economy 1981 89(1), 67-91
Starting from an initial (baseline) budget line, income-compensated price changes always resulted in substitution effects consistent with the Slutsky-Hicks theory. This behavior cannot be explained by a simple random-behavior model. Similar changes in relative prices that did not originate from the initial (baseline) budget line resulted in "undersubstitution effects": The composition of consumption changed in the expected direction, but the magnitude of change was not large enough to be consistent with the initial commodity bundle chosen. These undersubstitution effects are not explainable by shifting preference patterns or anchoring effects found in inconsistent choice sequences with human subjects.