Intellectual collaboration in science includes formal coauthorship as well as presentation of papers at workshops, seminars, and professional meetings and informal commentary from colleagues, journal referees, and editors. While the incidence and extent of formal coauthorship are greater in biology than in economics, the extent of intellectual collaboration is greater in economics than in biology. Intellectual property rights to coauthored papers in economics tend to be assigned alphabetically, whereas biology is characterized by a strong merit‐based (nonalphabetical) assignment of intellectual property rights. These patterns do not result from differences in the relative importance of funding/physical capital.

This paper addresses the question, What happens to the arrest rate when the number of law enforcers increases? One implication of the analysis is that arrest statistics are a poor instrumental variable for judging the quality of law enforcement. Increasing the number of police can increase of decrease the number of arrests. An increased probability of arrest induces fewer criminal acts; hence the ambiguity. Because of this result, we apply the theory in the setting of college basketball. We find a large reduction, 34 percent, in the number of fouls committed during a basketball game when the number of referees increases from two to three. Additional empirical evidence is presented which suggests that this elastic supply of basketball crime is due to more competent officiating and cleaner play.

This paper addresses the question, What happens to the arrest rate when the number of law enforcers increases? One implication of the analysis is that arrest statistics are a poor instrumental variable for judging the quality of law enforcement. Increasing the number of police can increase of decrease the number of arrests. An increased probability of arrest induces fewer criminal acts; hence the ambiguity. Because of this result, we apply the theory in the setting of college basketball. We find a large reduction, 34 percent, in the number of fouls committed during a basketball game when the number of referees increases from two to three. Additional empirical evidence is presented which suggests that this elastic supply of basketball crime is due to more competent officiating and cleaner play.

[We defend Adam Smith's theory of the firm from the standpoint of positive economics. We argue that his evaluation of the joint-stock firm was not moralistic but instead based on available empirical evidence. The record showed that joint-stock companies had a poor survivorship record, even when granted legal monopoly status. His analysis contained an explanation of the role of agency costs within the firm. Finally, he did not discuss the East India Company as an ordinary joint-stock firm but rather as an aberrant form created by government.]

We defend Adam Smith's theory of the firm from the standpoint of positive economics. We argue that his evaluation of the joint-stock firm was not moralistic but instead based on available empirical evidence. The record showed that joint-stock companies had a poor survivorship record, even when granted legal monopoly status. His analysis contained an explanation of the role of agency costs within the firm. Finally, he did not discuss the East India Company as an ordinary joint-stock firm but rather as an aberrant form created by government.

We present a model of the legislature as a union, where in some states the legislative wage is set in the constitution (the analogue to competition) and in others it is set by the legislators (monopoly). We test the implications of the model with respect to relative legislator wages in the two types of states and with respect to other aspects of the legislature as a union. All of the implications hold up quite well in empirical tests. Indeed, as expected, we find an astonishingly large impact of the legislative union on relative wages, that is, on the order of a 225 percent increase.

We present a model of the legislature as a union, where in some states the legislative wage is set in the constitution (the analogue to competition) and in others it is set by the legislators (monopoly). We test the implications of the model with respect to relative legislator wages in the two types of states and with respect to other aspects of the legislature as a union. All of the implications hold up quite well in empirical tests. Indeed, as expected, we find an astonishingly large impact of the legislative union on relative wages, that is, on the order of a 225 percent increase.