This paper investigates whether and how the distribution of income affects the fraction of disposable income which is consumed. It is shown that a slight generalization of the permanent income or "life-cycle" model of consumption makes each individual's lifetime marginal propensity to consume a fraction of his lifetime disposable resources unless two taste parameters are equal. In considering what this implies for the aggregate consumption function, the tenuous connection between theoretical constructs and observed facts is stressed. Previous empirical work on the subject is criticized for failing to define properly either "income distribution" or "consumption," and a new test, based on the theory, is outlined. Because of data limitations, a number of compromises with this ideal test must be made, and several alternative models are estimated. On the whole, they suggest that equalizing the distribution of income would either leave aggregate consumption unchanged or diminish it slightly.

A method for evaluating publicly subsidized housing is presented and applied to New York City's Mitchell-Lama middle-income housing program. Households occupying the 57,000 subsidized dwelling units received net benefits of 25.6 million, or 450 per household, in 1968. The public subsidy required to provide these benefits was 46.9 million, or 824 per unit. Hence, rather substantial nontenant benefits of 21.3 million, or 374 per unit, would have had to be generated by the program for it to be considered an efficient use of resources. Net benefits to participants were found to rise with age of household head and family size, to be lower for female-headed households, and to show little relation to income level. However, net benefits varied considerably for otherwise similar households. Finally, program participants were found to differ little on average from those occupying private, unsubsidized rental housing in New York City in 1968.

Both the Averch-Johnson (A-J) model and the Chamberlin model fail to consider the value of excess capacity to consumers. Service industries, whether they are regulated or not, will usually have excess capacity in the Chamberlinian sense because this capacity conserves time for consumers. This paper examines a model of the taxi industry where allowance is made for capacity to affect the value or quality of the service through its effect on waiting time. The central issue is to determine equilibrium output, capacity, and the utilization of capacity when the market is organized as a franchised monopoly, through a medallion system, and when there is free entry, and to exhibit the relationship among these variables and prices, cost of capacity and output, and policies of the regulator. It is found that many of the characteristics of taxi markets that would appear to confirm the monopolistic-competition thesis arise because of the nature of regulation of these markets.