From automobile insurance data for Alberta over the period 1974-81, we find thatpremiums are highly correlated across driver classes in a given year, but that premiums for a given driver class are not correlated over a period of more than 5 years. Firms' relative market shares among drivers over age 25 and married males under 25 are inversely related to their deviations from the mean premiums.In these driver classes, the variance of real premiums decreases with the numberof firms in the market and increases with the real loss cost per car insured and the number of cars insured. From these results we conclude that the price dispersion in automobile insurance in Alberta is based on costly consumer search.

The theoretical basis for measuring child costs is discussed, and detailed consideration is given to two straightforward procedures for calculation, Engel's food share method and Rothbarth's adult good method. Each of these methods embodies different definitions of child costs so that the same empirical evidence can generate quite different estimates depending on the method used. It is shown that true costs are generally overstated by Engel's method and understated by Rothbarth's procedure, although the latter, unlike the former, can provide a sensible starting point for cost measurement. Our estimates from Sri Lankan and Indonesian data suggest that children cost their parents about 30-40 percent of what they spend on themselves.

Indivisibilities in consumption, investment, choice of employment, and so forth have been used by others to justify the behavior of the insurance-buying gambler. Unfortunately, these theories ignore the market incentives to make the indivisible divisible through leasing or variation in quality, as well as individual initiative through borrowing and lending. In this paper the same behavior toward risk is explained without resort to indivisibilities or market imperfections, using the effect of work rates and retirement decisions on lifetime earning profiles. This is done using assumptions normally consistent with risk aversion: diminishing marginal utility of consumption and time-separable utility.

Indivisibilities in consumption, investment, choice of employment, and so forth have been used by others to justify the behavior of the insurance-buying gambler. Unfortunately, these theories ignore the market incentives to make the indivisible divisible through leasing or variation in quality, as well as individual initiative through borrowing and lending. In this paper the same behavior toward risk is explained without resort to indivisibilities or market imperfections, using the effect of work rates and retirement decisions on lifetime earning profiles. This is done using assumptions normally consistent with risk aversion: diminishing marginal utility of consumption and time-separable utility.

The theoretical basis for measuring child costs is discussed, and detailed consideration is given to two straightforward procedures for calculation, Engel's food share method and Rothbarth's adult good method. Each of these methods embodies different definitions of child costs so that the same empirical evidence can generate quite different estimates depending on the method used. It is shown that true costs are generally overstated by Engel's method and understated by Rothbarth's procedure, although the latter, unlike the former, can provide a sensible starting point for cost measurement. Our estimates from Sri Lankan and Indonesian data suggest that children cost their parents about 30-40 percent of what they spend on themselves.

From automobile insurance data for Alberta over the period 1974-81, we find thatpremiums are highly correlated across driver classes in a given year, but that premiums for a given driver class are not correlated over a period of more than 5 years. Firms' relative market shares among drivers over age 25 and married males under 25 are inversely related to their deviations from the mean premiums.In these driver classes, the variance of real premiums decreases with the numberof firms in the market and increases with the real loss cost per car insured and the number of cars insured. From these results we conclude that the price dispersion in automobile insurance in Alberta is based on costly consumer search.