This paper considers a model of elections in which parties compete simultaneously for multiple districts. I show that if districts are heterogeneous, then a unique two‐party equilibrium exists under plurality rule in which further entry is deterred. The equilibrium requires that parties choose noncentrist policy platforms and not converge to the ideal policy of the median voter. These characteristics are consistent with empirical observation, in contrast to those of single‐district models. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are then characterized and related to Duverger’s law. The existence of multiple‐party equilibria in this environment is also considered.

Polarization is both a description of the current state of politics and a dynamic path that has rippled across the political domain over decades. We provide a simple model that explains why polarization appears incrementally and why it was elites who polarized first and more dramatically, whereas mass polarization came later and has been less pronounced. We incorporate an ostensibly unrelated finding about how voters form preferences into a dynamic model of elections. This change, when combined with the response of strategic candidates, creates a feedback loop that can replicate many features of the data. We explore the model’s implications for other aspects of politics and trace what it predicts for the future of polarization.

Expert advice often extends beyond a simple recommendation, including information about alternative options. To explore the role of this referential advice, we enrich the expert’s informational advantage in a canonical model of communication with hard information. We show that when constructed just right, referential advice dissuades the decision maker from choosing options other than the recommendation, thereby making the recommendation itself more persuasive. We identify an equilibrium in which, with probability 1, the expert is strictly better off providing referential advice than she is in any equilibrium in which she provides a recommendation alone.