We consider organizations that optimally choose the level of adaptation to a changing environment when coordination among specialized tasks is a concern. Adaptive organizations provide employees with flexibility to tailor their tasks to local information. Coordination is maintained by limiting specialization and improving communication. Alternatively, by letting employees stick to some preagreed action plan, organizations can ensure coordination without communication, regardless of the extent of specialization. Among other things, our theory shows how extensive specialization results in organizations that ignore local knowledge, and it explains why improvements in communication technology may reduce specialization by pushing organizations to become more adaptive.

We argue that economists have studied the role of management from three perspectives: contingency theory (CT), an organization-centric empirical approach (OC), and a leader-centric empirical approach (LC). To reconcile these three perspectives, we augment a standard dynamic firm model with organizational capital, an intangible, slow-moving, productive asset that can be produced only with the direct input of the firm’s leadership and that is subject to an agency problem. We characterize the steady state of an economy with imperfect governance and show that it rationalizes key findings of CT, OC, and LC as well as generates a number of new predictions on performance, management practices, chief executive officer behavior and compensation, and governance.