Large productivity gains have been observed in Chinese agriculture following the transition from collective farming to household contracting. Using a model of mutual monitoring in an egalitarian production team, we estimate that labor supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total labor time for a sample of Chinese agricultural teams during 1970-76. These agency costs are lower than comparable estimates derived from aggregate data.

Large productivity gains have been observed in Chinese agriculture following the transition from collective farming to household contracting. Using a model of mutual monitoring in an egalitarian production team, we estimate that labor supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total labor time for a sample of Chinese agricultural teams during 1970-76. These agency costs are lower than comparable estimates derived from aggregate data.

We explore the evolution of financial innovation using US finance patents. Patented financial innovations are substantial and increasingly economically important. Their subject matter has changed, consistent with the industry’s shift toward household investors and borrowers. Information technology (IT) and other nonfinancial firms drove the surge in financial patenting. The location of innovation shifted, with banks moving activity away from states with tight financial regulation and high-tech regions attracting innovation by payments, IT, and nonfinancial firms. Analyses of returns suggest that the social value of these innovations is higher than their private value. We present a simple model to explain these trends.

The elasticity of taxable income is vital when predicting the effect of taxes. Bunching at kinks/notches has been used to estimate this elasticity. We show that when the preference distribution is unrestricted, bunching at a kink or a notch is not informative about the size of the elasticity, and neither is the entire distribution of taxable income. Bunching identifies the taxable income elasticity when the preference distribution is correctly specified across the kink and provides bounds under restrictions on the preference distribution. We find wide bounds in an empirical example based on upper and lower bounds for the preference density.