Knowledge that Transforms

A channel rebate is a payment from a manufacturer to a retailer based on retailer sales to end consumers. Two common forms of channel rebates are linear rebates, in which the rebate is paid for each unit sold, and target rebates, in which the rebate is paid for each unit sold beyond a specified target level. When demand is not influenced by sales effort, a properly designed target rebate achieves channel coordination and a win-win outcome. Coordination cannot be achieved by a linear rebate in a way that is implementable. When demand is influenced by retailer sales effort, a properly designed target rebate and returns contract achieves coordination and a win-win outcome. Other contracts, such as linear rebate and returns or target rebate alone, cannot achieve coordination in a way that is implementable. Contrary to the view expressed in the literature that accepting returns weakens incentives for retailer sales effort, we find that the provision of returns strengthens incentives for effort.

We draw on diverse data sets to compare the institutional organization of upstream life science research across the United States and Europe. Understanding cross-national differences in the organization of innovative labor in the life sciences requires attention to the structure and evolution of biomedical networks involving public research organizations (universities, government laboratories, nonprofit research institutes, and research hospitals), science-based biotechnology firms, and multinational pharmaceutical corporations. We use network visualization methods and correspondence analyses to demonstrate that innovative research in biomedicine has its origins in regional clusters in the United States and in European nations. But the scientific and organizational composition of these regions varies in consequential ways. In the United States, public research organizations and small firms conduct R&D across multiple therapeutic areas and stages of the development process. Ties within and across these regions link small firms and diverse public institutions, contributing to the development of a robust national network. In contrast, the European story is one of regional specialization with a less diverse group of public research organizations working in a smaller number of therapeutic areas. European institutes develop local connections to small firms working on similar scientific problems, while cross-national linkages of European regional clusters typically involve large pharmaceutical corporations. We show that the roles of large and small firms differ in the United States and Europe, arguing that the greater heterogeneity of the U.S. system is based on much closer integration of basic science and clinical development.

The small-office/home-office (SOHO) professionals comprise the fastest growing segment in the labor force today. Typically being a one-person business based at home, SOHO owners mostly rely on office information technology to single handedly run their entire operation. Despite the segment's ostensibly growing dependence and influence on the information technology (IT) industry, still very little is known about the dynamics between SOHO and IT products. With the purpose of addressing this void, we investigate the SOHO professionals' adoption patterns of multigenerational IT products. Accordingly, we develop and empirically estimate an individual SOHO-level initial- and repeat-purchase logit model that captures the procurement patterns for successive generations of technological products, namely the PC category. Specifically, we find that SOHO professionals' procurement choices are influenced by a number of salient dimensions (i.e., income, performance, price, interpurchase time, network externalities). Furthermore, some SOHO owners are found to have a preference for a future (expected) generation (over a currently available one), which is explained via their business dispositions (i.e., technology orientation, result orientation, search orientation) toward accepting technological incertitude.

In this paper we explore the degree to which patents are representative of the magnitude, direction, and impact of the knowledge spilling out of the university by focusing on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and in particular, on the Departments of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, we show that patenting is a minority activity: a majority of the faculty in our sample never patent, and publication rates far outstrip patenting rates. Most faculty members estimate that patents account for less than 10% of the knowledge that transfers from their labs. Our results also suggest that in two important ways patenting is not representative of the patterns of knowledge generation and transfer from MIT: patent volume does not predict publication volume, and those firms that cite MIT papers are in general not the same firms as those that cite MIT patents. However, patent volume is positively correlated with paper citations, suggesting that patent counts may be reasonable measures of research impact. We close by speculating on the implications of our results for the difficult but important question of whether, in this setting, patenting acts as a substitute or a complement to the process of fundamental research.

This paper derives the optimal simultaneous capacity and production plan for a shortlife-cycle, produce-to-stock good under stochastic demand. Capacity can be reduced as well as added, at exogenously set unit prices. In both cases studied, with and without carryover of unsold units, a target interval policy is optimal: There is a (usually different) target interval for each period such that capacity should be changed as little as possible to bring the level available into that interval. Our contribution in the case of no carry-over, is a detailed characterization of the target intervals, assuming demands increase stochastically at the beginning of the life cycle and decrease thereafter. In the case of carry-over, we establish the general result and show that capacity and inventory are economic substitutes: The target intervals decrease in the initial stock level and the optimal unconstrained base stock level decreases in the capacity level. In both cases, optimal service rates are not necessarily constant over time. A numerical example illustrates the results.

New start-up companies, which are considered to be a vital ingredient in a successful economy, have a different objective than established companies: They want to maximise their chance of long-term survival. We examine the implications for their operating decisions of this different criterion by considering an abstraction of the inventory problem faced by a start-up manufacturing company. The problem is modelled under two criteria as a Markov decision process; the characteristics of the optimal policies under the two criteria are compared. It is shown that although the start-up company should be more conservative in its component purchasing strategy than if it were a well-established company, it should not be too conservative. Nor is its strategy monotone in the amount of capital it has available. The models are extended to allow for interest on investment and inflation.

In many new product development (NPD) situations, the development process is characterized by uncertainty, and no single development approach will necessarily lead to a successful product. To increase the likelihood of having at least one successful product, multiple approaches may be simultaneously funded at the various NPD stages. The managerial challenge is to construct ex ante an appropriate NPD pipeline by choosing the right number of approaches to be funded at each stage. This so-called pipeline problem is also present in, among others, advertising copy selection and new products test markets problems. We describe here a normative model for structuring pipelines for such situations. The optimal structure of the pipeline is driven by the cost of the development approach, its probability of survival, and the expected profitability. We illustrate the workability and implications of the model by applying it to some real-world scenarios in the pharmaceutical industry, and by comparing its normative pipeline recommendations against actual pipelines. Our results suggest that, for the cases we studied, firms tend to use narrower pipelines for their new drug development than they should, and thereby they underspend on research and development. We also present general qualitative insights for one- and two-stage NPD optimal pipeline structures.

We develop a model of customer choice in response to random variation in quality. The choice model yields closed-form expressions which reflect the effect of competing suppliers' service quality on the long-run fraction of purchases a customer makes at the various competitors. We then use the expressions as the basis of simple normative models for suppliers seeking to maximize their long-run average profits. The results provide insight into the effect of switching behavior on the service levels offered by competing suppliers.

Researchers have recently been interested in studying the drivers of store-brand success as well as factors that motivate retailers to introduce store brands. In this paper, we study the effects of the introduction of a store-brand into a particular product category. Specifically, we are interested in the effect of store-brand introduction on the demand as well as on the supply side. On the demand side, we investigate the changes in preferences for the national brands and price elasticities in the category. On the supply side, we study the effects of the new entrant on the interactions between the national brand manufacturers and the retailer introducing the store brand, including how these interactions influence the retailer's pricing behavior. In doing so, we are also able to test whether the observed data are consistent with some of the commonly used assumptions regarding retailer pricing behavior. For the demand specification we use a random coefficients logit model that allows for consumer heterogeneity. The model parameters are estimated using aggregate data while explicitly accounting for endogeneity in retail prices. Our empirical results obtained from the oats product category based on store-level data from a multistore retail chain indicate that the store-brand introduction generates notable changes within the category. The store-brand introduction coincides with an increase in the retailer's margins for the national brand. We find that the preferences for the national brand are relatively unaffected by the introduction of the store-brand. While consumers are, in general, more price sensitive (in terms of elasticities) than they were prior to store-brand introduction, a statistical test of the differences in mean price elasticities across stores and between the two regimes fails to reject the hypothesis of no change in these elasticities. Elasticities in specific stores however, do increase after the store brand is introduced. We also find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the preferences for the store-brand. On the supply side, we test several forms of manufacturer-retailer interactions to identify retailer pricing behavior most consistent with the data. Our results indicate that the data reject several, commonly imposed, forms of interactions. In examining the nature of manufacturer interactions with the retailer, we find that the manufacturer of the national brand appears to take a softer stance in its interactions with the retailer subsequent to store-brand entry. This finding is consistent with academic research and with articles in the popular press which suggest that the store brand enhances the retailer's bargaining ability vis-à-vis the manufacturers of the national brands. We also provide results from a second product category frozen pasta) that are largely consistent with those found in the oats category.

Scale economies are commonplace in operations, yet because of analytical challenges, relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence. This paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies; (i.e., each firm's cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand). A general framework is used, which incorporates competition between two service providers with price- and time-sensitive demand (a queuing game), and competition between two retailers with fixed-ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers (an Economic Order Quantity game). Reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium, with both firms participating in the market. We demonstrate, in the context of the queuing game, that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price, an enviable situation. We also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier. Even if the supplier's technology is no better than the firms' technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity (so the supplier's scale can be no greater than either firm's scale), we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource. We conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature.