Knowledge that Transforms

Several referees were inadvertently omitted from the December 2004 issue of Management Science. The editors apologize for this oversight and offer their sincere thanks to the following referees for their vital support of the journal over the past year.

We consider a model for a serial supply chain in which production, inventory, and transportation decisions are integrated in the presence of production capacities and concave cost functions. The model we study generalizes the uncapacitated serial single-item multilevel economic lot-sizing model by adding stationary production capacities at the manufacturer level. We present algorithms with a running time that is polynomial in the planning horizon when all cost functions are concave. In addition, we consider different transportation and inventory holding cost structures that yield improved running times: inventory holding cost functions that are linear and transportation cost functions that are either linear, or are concave with a fixed-charge structure. In the latter case, we make the additional common and reasonable assumption that the variable transportation and inventory costs are such that holding inventories at higher levels in the supply chain is more attractive from a variable cost perspective. While the running times of the algorithms are exponential in the number of levels in the supply chain in the general concave cost case, the running times are remarkably insensitive to the number of levels for the other two cost structures.

There are two sources of agency costs under moral hazard: (1) distortions in incentive contracts and (2) implementation of suboptimal decisions. In the accounting literature, the relation between conservative accounting and agency costs of type (1) has received considerable attention (cf. Watts 2002). However, little appears to be known about the effects of accounting conservatism on agency costs of type (2) or trade-offs between agency costs of types (1) and (2). The purpose of this study is to examine this void. In a principal-agent setting in which the principal motivates the agent to expend effort using accounting earnings, this study shows that accounting earnings become more useful for reducing agency costs of type (2) when measured conservatively than when measured aggressively. Combined with the result in Kwon et al. (2001) that agency costs of type (1) decrease with accounting conservatism, this analysis suggests that conservative accounting enhances the incentive value of accounting signals with respect to both types of agency costs.

How can firms profitably give away free products? This paper provides a novel answer and articulates trade-offs in a space of information product design. We introduce a formal model of two-sided network externalities based in textbook economics—a mix of Katz and Shapiro network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation. Externality-based complements, however, exploit a different mechanism than either tying or lock-in even as they help to explain many recent strategies such as those of firms selling operating systems, Internet browsers, games, music, and video. The model presented here argues for three simple but useful results. First, even in the absence of competition, a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity. Second, we identify distinct markets for content providers and end consumers and show that either can be a candidate for a free good. Third, product coupling across markets can increase consumer welfare even as it increases firm profits. The model also generates testable hypotheses on the size and direction of network effects while offering insights to regulators seeking to apply antitrust law to network markets.

This paper reports the results of an experimental parameter-free elicitation and decomposition of decision weights under uncertainty. Assuming cumulative prospect theory, utility functions were elicited for gains and losses at an individual level using the tradeoff method. Subsequently, decision weights were elicited through certainty equivalents of uncertain two-outcome prospects. Furthermore, decision weights were decomposed using observable choice instead of invoking other empirical primitives, as in previous experimental studies. The choice-based elicitation of decision weights allows for a quantitative study of their characteristics, and also allows, among other things, for the examination of the sign-dependence hypothesis for observed choice under uncertainty. Our results confirm concavity of the utility function in the gain domain and bounded subadditivity of decision weights and choice-based subjective probabilities. We also find evidence for sign dependence of decision weights.

We study the demand forecast-sharing process between a buyer of customized production equipment and a set of equipment suppliers. Based on a large data collection we undertook in the semiconductor equipment supply chain, we empirically investigate the relationship between the buyer's forecasting behavior and the supplier's delivery performance. The buyer's forecasting behavior is characterized by the frequency and magnitude of forecast revisions it requests (forecast volatility) as well as by the fraction of orders that were forecasted but never actually purchased (forecast inflation). The supplier's delivery performance is measured by its ability to meet delivery dates requested by the customers. Based on a duration analysis, we are able to show that suppliers penalize buyers for unreliable forecasts by providing lower service levels. Vice versa, we also show that buyers penalize suppliers that have a history of poor service by providing them with overly inflated forecasts.

In this paper, we study a serial two-echelon supply chain selling a procure-to-stock product in a price-sensitive market. Our analytical modelling framework incorporates optimal pricing and stocking decisions for both echelons in the presence of stochastic demand and random delivery times. We focus on understanding how these decisions for the chain are affected by its management paradigm (centralized or decentralized), and its business characteristics—price sensitivity, demand uncertainty, and delivery time variability. A novel combination of transformations enables us to analyze the framework and determine the unique optimal choices for centralized and wholesale price-based decentralized supply chains. More detailed investigation reveals that, in general, the business characteristics influence both the behavior and the optimal values of the decision variables, while the management paradigm primarily governs the optimal values. We illustrate the significance of these results in terms of how managers should tailor their decisions to align with their business requirements. Subsequently, comparison of the optimal profits between the channel partners and the management paradigms provides implications for decentralization strategy. A decentralized chain is most inefficient for moderately price-sensitive customers and uncertain environments, but is relatively more effective when dealing with mature products. We propose a contracting scheme that can improve the decentralized chain profit in reliable delivery time settings. The salient modelling insight of this paper is that ignoring the randomness of delivery time trivializes the interaction between pricing and stocking decisions. On the other hand, from a managerial viewpoint, we establish that optimal pricing policies provide the means to increase revenue and also act as strategic tools for tackling uncertainty.

In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, “Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1–25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.