Knowledge that Transforms

In models of decision making under uncertainty, one typically has to approximate the uncertainties by a limited number of discrete outcomes. Høyland and Wallace (2001) formulate a nonlinear programming problem to generate such a limited number of discrete outcomes while satisfying specified statistical properties. They have developed and employed this method for a stochastic multistage asset-allocation problem. When the method is applied to such financial optimization problems under uncertainty, we argue here that it does not suffice to match statistical properties. To obtain realistic outcomes, the (limited) description of the uncertainty in such models should also exclude arbitrage opportunities, and thereby be consistent with financial asset pricing theory. We illustrate that the method proposed by Høyland and Wallace can result in arbitrage opportunities in the scenario tree if only statistical properties are imposed. We show how one can check ex post for the presence of arbitrage opportunities in a scenario tree by checking for the existence of solutions to sets of linear equations. Arbitrage opportunities can also be precluded ex ante in the scenario tree by adding constraints to the nonlinear programming problem of Høyland and Wallace.

Online information servers that provide access to diverse databases where users can search for, browse through, and download the information they need have been rapidly increasing in number in the past few years. Online vendors have traditionally charged users for information on the based on the length of the time they were connected to the databases. With hardware and software advances, many online servers have recently started changing their pricing strategies to search-based and/or subscription-fee pricing. This paper examines the various issues involved in pricing these information products, and presents an economic approach to analyze conditions under which the various pricing schemes may prove optimal for the online servers. Our results show that the variation in consumer expertise and valuation of information affects the choice of a pricing strategy by the server. We present general conditions under which subscription-fee pricing is optimal even when consumer demand is inelastic. We also find that, given the cost structures characterizing the market, undifferentiated online servers can compete and coexist in the market each making positive profits. We show that in a competitive setting an increase in costs of online servers can sometimes benefit them by enabling them to differentiate themselves. Our results offer insights into the trends in pricing strategies and may provide an explanation as to why many servers may persist with connect-time strategies.

In this paper we develop a measure of liquidity, price impact, which quantifies the change in a firm's stock price associated with its observed net trading volume. For a large set of institutional trades we compare out-of-sample, characteristic-based estimates of price impact to actual price impacts. Predictive predetermined firm characteristics, chosen to proxy for the severity of adverse selection in the equity market, the non-information-based costs of making a market in the stock, and the extent of shareholder heterogeneity, include relative size, historical relative trading volume, institutional holdings, and the inverse of the stock price. We find numerous aspects of trade execution which are significantly related to the price impact forecast error in economically plausible ways: For example, the predicted price impact overestimates the actual price impact for very large trades, for trades executed in a more patient manner, and for trades where the institution pays higher commissions.

Increasingly, business clients are actively leading information systems (IS) projects, often in collaboration with IS professionals, and they are exercising a greater degree of project control. Control is defined as all attempts to motivate individuals to achieve desired objectives, and it can be exercised via formal and informal modes. Much of the previous research investigating the choice of control mode has focused on direct reporting relationships between IS project leaders and their superiors in a hierarchical setting. However, the client-IS relationships may take on a variety of forms, including both hierarchical and lateral settings. Moreover, prior research has found that the knowledge of the systems development process is a key antecedent of control, yet clients are unlikely to be as knowledgeable as IS professionals about this process. It is therefore unclear whether prior findings will generalize to the client-IS pair, and the goal of this research is to examine the exercise of control across this relationship. Data were gathered from a questionnaire survey of 69 pairs of clients and IS project leaders. The results are largely consistent with prior research on the antecedents of formal control modes, but they shed new insight on the choice of informal control modes.

We examine, both theoretically and empirically, top-management compensation in the presence of agency conflicts when shareholders have delegated governance responsibilities to a self-interested Board of Directors (BOD). We develop a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates the BOD as a strategic player, models the negotiation process between the CEO and the BOD in designing CEO compensation, and considers the impact of potential takeovers by large shareholders monitoring the CEO-BOD negotiations. In equilibrium, internal governance by the BOD and external takeover threats by a large shareholder act as substitutes in imposing managerial control, especially in constraining management's profligacy in awarding equity-based compensation to itself. The model emphasizes factors in the design of compensation contracts that are rarely considered in the literature, such as equity ownership of the largest outside shareholder and the firm's bankruptcy risk. It also provides new perspectives on factors that are often considered in the literature, such as firm size, firm performance, equity ownership of the BOD, and BOD structure. Our empirical tests lend considerable support for our theoretical predictions. Equity ownership of the largest external shareholder, that of the BOD, and the default risk, are strongly negatively related to the size of CEO equity compensation. Consistent with the theoretical model, these factors do not significantly influence the growth of fixed (or non-performance-related) compensation. We also find that the equity ownership of the BOD is more important in managerial compensation control than other BOD related variables, such as BOD size or the proportion of outside directors.

Many service firms are pursuing electronic distribution strategies to augment existing physical infrastructure for product and service delivery. But little systematic study has been made for whether and how characteristics or behaviors might differ between customers who use electronic delivery systems and those who use traditional channels. We explore these differences by comparing customers who utilize personal-computer-based home banking (PC banking) to other bank customers. Case studies and detailed customer data from four institutions suggest that PC banking customers are apparently more profitable, principally due to unobservable characteristics extant before the adoption of PC banking. Demographic characteristics and changes in customer behavior following adoption of PC banking account for only a small fraction of overall differences. It also appears that retention is marginally higher for customers of the online channel.

Scale economies are commonplace in operations, yet because of analytical challenges, relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence. This paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies; (i.e., each firm's cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand). A general framework is used, which incorporates competition between two service providers with price- and time-sensitive demand (a queuing game), and competition between two retailers with fixed-ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers (an Economic Order Quantity game). Reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium, with both firms participating in the market. We demonstrate, in the context of the queuing game, that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price, an enviable situation. We also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier. Even if the supplier's technology is no better than the firms' technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity (so the supplier's scale can be no greater than either firm's scale), we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource. We conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature.

In the traditional new product development process, manufacturers first explore user needs and then develop responsive products. Developing an accurate understanding of a user need is not simple or fast or cheap, however. As a result, the traditional approach is coming under increasing strain as user needs change more rapidly, and as firms increasingly seek to serve “markets of one.” Toolkits for user innovation is an emerging alternative approach in which manufacturers actually abandon the attempt to understand user needs in detail in favor of transferring need-related aspects of product and service development to users. Experience in fields where the toolkit approach has been pioneered show custom products being developed much more quickly and at a lower cost. In this paper we explore toolkits for user innovation and explain why and how they work.

Commercializing knowledge involves transfer from discovering scientists to those who will develop it commercially. New codes and formulae describing discoveries develop slowly-with little incentive if value is low and many competing opportunities if high. Hence new knowledge remains naturally excludable and appropriable. Team production allows more knowledge capture of tacit, complex discoveries by firm scientists. A robust indicator of a firm's tacit knowledge capture (and strong predictor of its success) is the number of research articles written jointly by firm scientists and discovering, “star” scientists, nearly all working at top universities. An operationally attractive generalization of our star measure-collaborative research articles between firm scientists and top research university scientists-replicates the impact on firm success. In panel analyses, publications by firm scientists with stars and/or top 112 university scientists increase the number and citation rate for firm patents. Further, star articles increase these rates significantly more than other top 112 university scientists' articles. Cross-sectional analyses of products and employment show a similar pattern of positive effects on firms' success of collaborations with stars or top university scientists, but estimates of differential effects are nonrobust due to multicollinearity. Venture capital funding has significant, usually positive effects on firm success.