Knowledge that Transforms

We consider a multiperiod single product pricing problem with an unknown demand curve. The seller’s objective is to adjust prices in each period so as to maximize cumulative expected revenues over a given finite time horizon; in doing so, the seller needs to resolve the tension between learning the unknown demand curve and maximizing earned revenues. The main question that we investigate is the following: How large of a revenue loss is incurred if the seller uses a simple parametric model that differs significantly (i.e., is misspecified) relative to the underlying demand curve? We measure performance by analyzing the price trajectory induced by this misspecified model and quantifying the magnitude of revenue losses (as a function of the time horizon) relative to an oracle that knows the true underlying demand curve. The “price of misspecification” is expected to be significant if the parametric model is overly restrictive. Somewhat surprisingly, we show (under reasonably general conditions) that this need not be the case.

Microenterprises constitute an important source of employment, and developing such enterprises is a key policy concern in most countries. But what is the most efficient tool for microenterprise development? We study this question in a developing country context (Tanzania), where microenterprises are the source of employment for more than half of the labor force, and we report from a field experiment that jointly investigated the importance of a human capital intervention (business training) and a financial capital intervention (business grant). Using data from three survey rounds, a lab experiment, and administrative records of the microfinance institution, we present evidence on business performance, management practices, happiness, business knowledge, and noncognitive abilities. Our study demonstrates strong effects of the combination of the two interventions on male entrepreneurs, while the effects on female entrepreneurs are much more muted. The results suggest that long-term finance is an important constraint for microfinance entrepreneurs, but that business training is essential to transform financial capital into productive investments. Our study also points to the need for more comprehensive measures to promote the businesses of female entrepreneurs. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1933 .

Although individuals can derive substantial benefits from exchanging information and ideas, many individuals are reluctant to seek advice from others. We find that people are reticent to seek advice for fear of appearing incompetent. This fear, however, is misplaced. We demonstrate that individuals perceive those who seek advice as more competent than those who do not. This effect is moderated by task difficulty, advisor egocentrism, and advisor expertise. Individuals perceive those who seek advice as more competent when the task is difficult rather than when it is easy, when people seek advice from them personally rather than when they seek advice from others and when people seek advice from experts rather than from nonexperts or not at all.

In using the generalized second-price (GSP) auction to sell advertising slots, a search engine faces several challenges. Advertisers do not truthfully bid their valuations, and the valuations are uncertain. Furthermore, advertisers are budget constrained. In this paper we analyze a stylized model of the first-page bid estimate (FPBE) mechanism first developed by Google and demonstrate its advantages in dealing with these challenges. We show why and when the FPBE mechanism yields higher profits for the search engine compared with the traditional GSP auction and the GSP auction with advertiser-specific minimum bid. In the event that a high-valuation advertiser is budget constrained, the search engine can use the FPBE mechanism to alter the listing order with the intent of keeping the high-valuation advertiser in the auction for a longer time. The resulting increase in the search engine’s profits is not necessarily at the expense of the advertisers because the combined profits of the advertisers and the search engine increase.

We study the nonstandard optimal exercise policy associated with relevant capital investment options and with the prepayment option of widespread collateralized-borrowing contracts like the gold loan. Option exercise is optimally postponed not only when moneyness is insufficient, but also when it is excessive. We extend the classical optimal exercise properties for American options. Early exercise of an American call with a negative underlying payout rate can occur if the option is moderately in the money. We fully characterize the existence, the monotonicity, the continuity, the limits, and the asymptotic behavior at maturity of the double free boundary that separates the exercise region from the double continuation region. We find that the finite-maturity nonstandard policy conspicuously differs from the infinite-maturity one.

Using one of the largest samples of litigation data available to date, we examine whether the political culture of a firm determines its propensity for corporate misconduct. We measure political culture using the political contributions of top managers, firm political action committees, and local residents. We show that firms with a Republican culture are more likely to be the subject of civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation than are Democratic firms, consistent with the Democratic ideology that emphasizes equal rights, labor rights, and environmental protection. However, firms with a Democratic culture are more likely to be the subject of litigation related to securities fraud and intellectual property rights violations than are Republican firms, whose party ideology stresses self-reliance, property rights, market discipline, and limited government regulation. Upon litigation filing, both types of firms experience similar announcement reaction, which suggests that the observed relationship between political culture and corporate misconduct is unlikely to reflect differences in expected litigation costs. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2106 .

This paper examines the role of firms' sociopolitical reputations, as proxied by their perceived engagement in socially responsible practices, in public policy makers' decisions to grant access in the policy-making process. I argue that policy makers' dependencies, motivations, and decision-making processes lead them to evaluate firms by using sociopolitical reputation as a differentiating heuristic. I hypothesize that firms that construct stronger sociopolitical reputations will be granted greater access and that firms' existing political activity and policy makers' partisanship will moderate this relationship. I test these hypotheses using an 11-year panel on congressional testimony, reputation, and political and financial characteristics for the S&P 500 and find support for all three. These findings support the existence of a sociopolitical dimension to firms' reputations that affects how public policy makers evaluate firms, demonstrating that corporate social responsibility pays political benefits.

We analyze a model of industry evolution where the number of active submarkets is endogenously determined by pioneering innovation from incumbents and entrants. Incumbent pioneers enjoy an advantage of additional pioneering innovation via a dynamic capability that takes the form of an improved technology for innovation in young submarkets. Entrants are motivated in part by a desire to acquire the dynamic capability. We show that dynamic capabilities increase total innovation, but whether the capability confers an advantage in terms of marginal or average cost is important in determining how the impact of dynamic capabilities is distributed across incumbent and entrant innovation rates. We complement the existing literature—that focuses on exogenous arrival of submarkets or the steady state of a model with constant submarkets—by describing how competition, free entry, and the dynamic capability of incumbents drive the evolution of an industry. The shift from immature to mature submarkets can lead to a shakeout in firm numbers, and it eventually leads to a reduction in total dynamic capabilities in an industry.

Companies are increasingly drawing on their user communities to generate promising ideas for new products, which are then marketed as “user-designed” products to the broader consumer market. We demonstrate that nonparticipating, observing consumers prefer to buy from user- rather than designer-driven firms because of an enhanced identification with the firm that has adopted this user-driven philosophy. Three experimental studies validate a newly proposed social identification account underlying this effect. Because consumers are also users, their social identities connect to the user-designers, and they feel empowerment by vicariously being involved in the design process. This formed connection leads to preference for the firm’s products. Importantly, this social identification account also effectively predicts when the effect does not materialize. First, we find that if consumers feel dissimilar to participating users, the effects are attenuated. We demonstrate that this happens when the community differs from consumers along important demographics (i.e., gender) or when consumers are nonexperts in the focal domain (i.e., they feel that they do not belong to the social group of participating users). Second, the effects are attenuated if the user-driven firm is only selectively rather than fully open to participation from all users (observing consumers do not feel socially included). These findings advance the emerging theory on user involvement and offer practical implications for firms interested in pursuing a user-driven philosophy. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1999 .

We consider the problem of optimal decision making under uncertainty but assume that the decision maker’s utility function is not completely known. Instead, we consider all the utilities that meet some criteria, such as preferring certain lotteries over other lotteries and being risk averse, S-shaped, or prudent. These criteria extend the ones used in the first- and second-order stochastic dominance framework. We then give tractable formulations for such decision-making problems. We formulate them as robust utility maximization problems, as optimization problems with stochastic dominance constraints, and as robust certainty equivalent maximization problems. We use a portfolio allocation problem to illustrate our results.