Knowledge that Transforms

Using field data from an American financial services organization, we examined the effects of three important variables in Cyert and March's (1963) initial conceptualization of the aspiration-level adaptation process: The previous aspiration level, performance feedback, and social comparison. Past findings obtained in controlled contexts (Glynn et al. 1991; Lant 1992) have provided empirical support for the attainment discrepancy model (Lewin et al. 1944), which includes variables of the previous aspiration level and attainment discrepancy (i.e., performance feedback). We replicated these findings in the field: The effects of the previous aspiration level and attainment discrepancy on the current aspiration levels were significant and positive. In addition, we investigated the effect of social comparison using a variable based on the difference between the performance of the focal unit and the performance of comparable others (Greve 1998). Based on the assumption that decision makers in organizations will expect to observe similar performance levels among those in the same comparison group (Wood 1989), we posited that the effect of social comparison would be negative, refiecting managerial efforts to reduce performance discrepancies among similar units. The empirical results supported the prediction from this reasoning. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for theory and research in organizational learning and the behavioral theory of the firm.

This paper derives the optimal simultaneous capacity and production plan for a shortlife-cycle, produce-to-stock good under stochastic demand. Capacity can be reduced as well as added, at exogenously set unit prices. In both cases studied, with and without carryover of unsold units, a target interval policy is optimal: There is a (usually different) target interval for each period such that capacity should be changed as little as possible to bring the level available into that interval. Our contribution in the case of no carry-over, is a detailed characterization of the target intervals, assuming demands increase stochastically at the beginning of the life cycle and decrease thereafter. In the case of carry-over, we establish the general result and show that capacity and inventory are economic substitutes: The target intervals decrease in the initial stock level and the optimal unconstrained base stock level decreases in the capacity level. In both cases, optimal service rates are not necessarily constant over time. A numerical example illustrates the results.

Our goal is to assess the strategic and operational benefits of electronic integration for industrial procurement. We conduct a field study with an industrial supplier and examine the drivers of performance of the procurement process. Our research quantifies both the operational and strategic impacts of electronic integration in a B2B procurement environment for a supplier. Additionally, we show that the customer also obtains substantial benefits from efficient procurement transaction processing. We isolate the performance impact of technology choice and ordering processes on both the trading partners. A significant finding is that the supplier derives large strategic benefits when the customer initiates the system and the supplier enhances the system's capabilities. With respect to operational benefits, we find that when suppliers have advanced electronic linkages, the order-processing system significantly increases benefits to both parties.

This paper attempts to explain organization structure based on optimal coordination of interactions among activities. The main idea is that each manager is capable of detecting and coordinating interactions only within his limited area of expertise. Only the CEO can coordinate company wide interactions. The optimal design of the organization trades off the costs and benefits of various configurations of managers. Our results consist of classifying the characteristics of activities and managerial costs that lead to the matrix organization, the functional hierarchy, the divisional hierarchy, or a fiat hierarchy. We also investigate the effect of changing the costs of various managers on the nature of the optimal organization, including the extent of centralization.

Economic forces shape the behavior of individuals and institutions. Forces affecting individual behavior are attitudes about payoffs (gains and losses) and beliefs about outcomes (risk and ambiguity). Under risk, the likelihoods of alternative outcomes are fully known. Under ambiguity, these likelihoods are unknown. In our experiment, payoffs and outcomes were manipulated independently during a classical choice task as brain activity was measured with positron emission tomography (PET). Here, we show that attitudes about payoffs and beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes exhibit interaction effects both behaviorally and neurally. Participants are risk averse in gains and risk-seeking in losses; they are ambiguity-seeking in neither gains nor losses. Two neural substrates for choice surfaced in the interaction between attitudes and beliefs: a dorsomedial neocortical system and a ventromedial system. This finding reveals that the brain does not honor a prevalent assumption of economics—the independence of the evaluations of payoffs and outcomes. The demonstration of a relationship between brain activity and observed economic choice attests to the feasibility of a neuroeconomic decision science.

In this paper, we study an incentive problem that arises between a principal and two agents because they value a real option differently. The real option in our model is a timing option. The agents have limited capacity to undertake projects, and each agent's capacity can be filled now or later. Because the principal cares about capacity in the aggregate but each agent cares only about his own capacity, the agents assign a higher value to the option to wait. As a result, agents sometimes withhold ideas from the principal. We show that decentralization can be a solution to this problem. Delegating assignment rights to an agent reduces the option value of waiting for the other agent sufficiently that he is willing to reveal his ideas.

One-to-one promotions are possible when consumers are individually addressable and firms know something about each customer's preferences. We explore the competitive effects of one-to-one promotions in a model with two competing firms where the firms differ in size and consumers have heterogeneous brand loyalty. We find that one-to-one promotions always lead to an increase in price competition (average prices in the market decrease). However, we also find that one-to-one promotions affect market shares. This market-share effect may outweigh the effect of lower prices, benefiting the firm whose market share increases. Our results suggest that of two firms, the firm with the higher-quality product may gain from one-to-one promotions. Our model also has implications for the phenomenon of customer churn, where consumers switch to a less preferred brand due to targeted promotional incentives. We show that churning can arise optimally from firms pursuing a profit-maximizing strategy. Instead of trying to minimize it, the optimal way to manage customer churn is to engage in both offensive and defensive promotions with the relative mix depending on the marginal cost of targeting.

Marketers often stress the importance of treating customers as partners. A fundamental premise of this perspective is that all parties can be weakly better off if they work together to increase joint surplus and reach Pareto-efficient agreements. For marketing managers, this implies organizing marketing activities in a manner that maximizes total surplus. This logic is theoretically sound when agreements between partners are limitless and costless. In most consumer marketing contexts (business-to-consumer), this is typically not true. The question I ask is should one still expect firms to partner with consumers and reach Pareto-efficient agreements? In this paper, I use the example of a firm's choice of product configuration to demonstrate two effects. First, I show that a firm may configure a product in a manner that reduces total surplus but increases firm profits. Second, one might conjecture that increased competition would eliminate this effect, but I show that in a duopoly firm profits may be increasing in the cost of product completion. This second result suggests that firms may prefer to remain inefficient and/or stifie innovations. Both results violate a fundamental premise of partnering—that firms and consumers should work together to increase total surplus and reach Pareto-efficient agreements. The model illustrates that Pareto-efficient agreements are less likely to occur if negotiation with individual partners is infeasible or costly, such as in business-to–consumer contexts. Consumer marketers in one-to- many marketing environments should be wary of treating customers as partners because Pareto–efficient agreements may not be optimal for their firm.

Protecting confidential, numerical data in databases from disclosure is an important issue both for commercial organizations as well as data-gathering and disseminating organizations (such as the Census Bureau). Prior studies have shown that perturbation methods are effective in protecting such confidential data from snoopers. Perturbation methods have to provide legitimate users with accurate (unbiased) information, and also provide adequate security against disclosure of confidential information to snoopers. For databases described by nonnormal multivariate distributions, existing perturbation methods do not provide unbiased characteristics. In this study, we develop a copula-based perturbation method capable of maintaining the marginal distribution of perturbed attributes to be the same before and after perturbation. In addition, this method also preserves the rank order correlation between the confidential and nonconfidential attributes, thereby maintaining monotonic relationships between attributes. The method proposed in this study provides a high level of protection against inferential disclosure. An investigation of the new perturbation method for simulated databases shows that the method performs effectively. The methodology presented in this study represents a signicant step toward improving the practical applicability of data perturbation methods.

Mixed strategies are widely used to model strategic situations in diverse fields such as economics, marketing, political science, and biology. However, some of the implications of asymmetric mixed-strategy solutions are counterintuitive. We develop a stylized model of patent race to examine some of these implications. In our model two firms compete to develop a product and obtain a patent. However, one firm values the patent more because of its market advantages, such as brand reputation and distribution network. Contrary to some intuition, we find that the firm that values the patent less is likely to invest more aggressively in developing the product and will also win the patent more often. We argue that the reason for these counterintuitive results is inherent in the very concept of mixed strategy solution. In a laboratory test, we examine whether subjects' behavior conforms to the equilibrium predictions. We find that the aggregate behavior of our subjects is consistent with the game-theoretic predictions. With the help of the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model proposed by Camerer and Ho (1999), we show that adaptive learning can account for the investment behavior of our subjects.We find that the EWA learning model tracks the investment decisions of our subjects well, whether we hold out trials or an entire group of subjects.