Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines firms’ product policies when they sell an add-on (e.g., Internet service) in addition to a base product (e.g., hotel rooms) under vertical differentiation (e.g., four- versus three-star hotels). I show that the role of an add-on differs; higher-quality firms prefer to sell it as optional to discriminate consumers, and lower-quality firms trade off discrimination and differentiation, trying to lure consumers from higher-quality rivals with a lower-price add-on. Equilibrium policies of lower-quality firms are more sensitive to the cost-to-value ratio of an add-on. If the ratio is sufficiently small, then they sell it to all consumers, potentially explaining why lower-end hotels are more likely than higher-end ones to offer free Internet service. Contrary to consensus in the literature, optional add-ons can intensify price competition over consumers who trade off a higher-quality base product versus a lower-quality base including an add-on. Hence, higher-quality firms are incentivized to commit to bundling, while lower-quality firms prefer to commit to not selling it. Add-ons can further reduce lower-quality firms’ profits if consumers cannot observe the prices, because holding up consumers ex post encourages them to switch to higher-quality rivals, which then become better off. Therefore, lower-quality firms are incentivized to advertise add-on prices, and higher-quality firms are not. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1028 .

We leverage a temporary block of the Chinese microblogging platform Sina Weibo due to political events to estimate the causal effect of online word-of-mouth content on product demand in the context of TV show viewership. Based on this source of exogenous variation, we estimate an elasticity of TV show ratings (market share in terms of viewership) with respect to the number of relevant comments (comments were disabled during the block) of 0.016. We find that more postshow microblogging activity increases demand, whereas comments posted prior to the show airing do not affect viewership. These patterns are inconsistent with informative or persuasive effects and suggest complementarity between TV consumption and anticipated postshow microblogging activity. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1045 .

Managing marketing resources over time requires dynamic model estimation, which necessitates specifying some parametric or nonparametric probability distribution. When the data generating process differs from the assumed distribution, the resulting model is misspecified. To hedge against such a misspecification risk, the extant theory recommends using the sandwich estimator. This approach, however, only corrects the variance of estimated parameters, but not their values. Consequently, the sandwich estimator does not affect any managerial outcomes such as marketing budgeting and allocation decisions. To overcome this drawback, we present the minimax framework that does not necessitate distributional assumptions to estimate dynamic models. Applying minimax control theory, we derive an optimal robust filter, illustrate its application to a unique advertising data set from the Canadian Blood Services, and contribute several novel findings. We discover the compensatory effect: Advertising effectiveness increases and the carryover effect decreases as robustness increases. We also find that the robust filter uniformly outperforms the Kalman filter on the out-of-sample predictions. Furthermore, we uncover the existence of a profit-volatility trade-off, similar to the returns-risk trade-off in finance, whereby the volatility of profit stream decreases at the expense of reduced total profit as robustness increases. Finally, we prove that, unlike for-profit companies, managers of nonprofit organizations should optimally allocate budgets opposite the advertising-to-sales ratio heuristic; that is, advertise more (less) when sales are low (high). Data and the web appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2016.1010 .

We use monthly sales of all wines, beer, and spirits sold between 2006 and 2011 by Sweden’s retail monopoly on alcohol to estimate the causal effect of retail distribution on market share by volume at the product level. Products are defined at the level of the stock-keeping unit. Two institutional features are key to identifying the causal effect: First, the monopolist uses four levels of retail distribution; a change in retail distribution is therefore associated with a discrete shift in the number of stores that carry a product in a given month. Second, the retailer is legally bound and monitored by the European Union to ensure that it acts in a non-discriminatory manner with all its suppliers. These features allow us to rule out many possible confounding factors in estimating the effect of distribution on sales volume. We find large and statistically significant effects from changes in retail distribution on market share by volume across all levels of retail distribution. The associated volume elasticity of retail distribution is convex; the wider the retail distribution the greater the marginal volume increase from further widening. In this market, wider distribution means reaching stores with successively smaller assortment. Our results indicate that the smaller assortment in smaller stores, coupled with a low resistance to compromise, is the main reason for the convex pattern. In other words, convexity appears to be generated by products achieving “a larger share of a smaller pie” as retail distribution expands. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1038 .

A key conundrum facing organizations is how to adjust marketing budgets in response to the business cycle. While most firms use procyclical spending (spending less during economic contractions), academic studies often recommend countercyclical spending (spending more during contractions), which begs the following question: What is the right thing to do? The spending problem is compounded further when demand is not just driven by one country’s business cycle, but by the (nonsynchronized) business cycles of multiple countries, as is the case for tourism marketing aiming to attract tourists originating from different countries. We derive insights into the best way to allocate marketing budgets across countries under varying economic conditions. We show that the allocation decisions are driven by the procyclical versus countercyclical nature of three factors: unit sales, marketing effectiveness, and per-unit profit contribution. To study how unit sales and marketing effectiveness respond to the business cycle, we develop a transfer function dynamic hierarchical linear model. We also model the responsiveness of the profit contribution to the business cycle. In an application to New Zealand tourism marketing, we find that a reallocation of the government’s marketing budget could yield an increase in tourist revenues of NZD $121 million. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1046 .

In the pharmaceutical industry, a product recall financially impacts not only the firm undertaking the recall but also other competitors in the category since it affects physician and consumer perception of the category as a whole. Often, such competitors have to engage in defensive marketing at the category level without complete certainty about whether a recall will occur or not. Such defensive effort could then lead to a change in postrecall sales effort directed at capturing market share in that category. This decision is affected by the probability of the recall and the size of the loyal segment in the category facing the recall, i.e., physicians who will continue to prescribe the category even without marketing effort. We focus on competitor reaction to product recalls where the competitor participates in multiple product categories that exhibit (dis)economies of scope in sales effort across them. Equilibrium analysis of our game-theoretic model uncovers several managerial insights that illustrate the importance of scale (dis)economies on the competitor’s promotional strategy in the wake of a recall. First, economies of scope across the two products leads to either an increase or decrease in postrecall sales effort for both products simultaneously depending on the loyal market size for the category. Second, diseconomies of scope can lead to a complete withdrawal of postrecall sales effort from one of the two products depending on the size of the loyal market, the cross-category price, and the recall probability. Third, as the recall probability increases, category-defense effort and postrecall sales effort are unequivocally complementary given economies of scope across the two products but may be substitutes given diseconomies of scope. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1054 .

We develop a structural model of brand management to estimate the value of a brand to a firm. In our framework, a brand’s value is the expected net present value of future cash flows accruing to a firm due to its brand. Our brand value measure recognizes that a firm can change its brand equity by investing in advertising. We estimate quarterly brand values in the stacked chips category for the period 2001–2006 and explore how those values change over time. Comparing our brand value measure to its static counterpart, we find that a static measure, which ignores advertising and its ability to affect brand equity dynamics, yields brand values that are artificially high and that fluctuate too much over time. We also explore how changing the ability to build and sustain brand equity affects brand value. At our estimated parameterization, if brand equity were to depreciate more slowly, or if advertising were more effective at building brand equity, then brand value would increase. However, counterintuitively, we find that when the effectiveness of advertising is sufficiently high, increasing the rate at which brand equity depreciates can increase the value of a firm’s brand, even as it reduces the value of the firm overall. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2016.1020 .

Some firms use a curious pricing mechanism called “pay as you wish” pricing (PAYW). When PAYW is used, a firm lets consumers decide what a product is worth to them and how much they want to pay to get the product. This practice has been observed in a number of industries. In this paper, we theoretically investigate why and where PAYW can be a profitable pricing strategy relative to the conventional “pay as asked” pricing (PAAP) strategy. We show that PAYW has a number of advantages over PAAP such that it is well suited for some industries but not for others. These advantages are as follows: (1) PAYW helps a firm to maximally penetrate a market; (2) it allows a firm to price discriminate among heterogenous consumers; (3) it helps to moderate price competition. We derive conditions under which PAYW dominates PAAP and discuss ways to improve the profitability of PAYW.

We investigate the relationship between a firm’s use of management responses and its online reputation. We focus on the hotel industry and present several findings. First, hotels are likely to start responding following a negative shock to their ratings. Second, hotels respond to positive, negative, and neutral reviews at roughly the same rate. Third, by exploiting variation in the rate with which hotels respond on different review platforms and variation in the likelihood with which consumers are exposed to management responses, we find a 0.12-star increase in ratings and a 12% increase in review volume for responding hotels. Interestingly, when hotels start responding, they receive fewer but longer negative reviews. To explain this finding, we argue that unsatisfied consumers become less likely to leave short indefensible reviews when hotels are likely to scrutinize them. Our results highlight an interesting trade-off for managers considering responding: fewer negative ratings at the cost of longer and more detailed negative feedback. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1043 .