Knowledge that Transforms

This research extends a Pareto/NBD model of customer-base analysis using a hierarchical Bayesian (HB) framework to suit today's customized marketing. The proposed HB model presumes three tried and tested assumptions of Pareto/NBD models: (1) a Poisson purchase process, (2) a memoryless dropout process (i.e., constant hazard rate), and (3) heterogeneity across customers, while relaxing the independence assumption of the purchase and dropout rates and incorporating customer characteristics as covariates. The model also provides useful output for CRM, such as a customer-specific lifetime and survival rate, as by-products of the MCMC estimation. Using three different types of databases—music CD for e-commerce, FSP data for a department store and a music CD chain, the HB model is compared against the benchmark Pareto/NBD model. The study demonstrates that recency-frequency data, in conjunction with customer behavior and characteristics, can provide important insights into direct marketing issues, such as the demographic profile of best customers and whether long-life customers spend more.

Prior marketing literature has overlooked the role of regulatory regimes in explaining international sales growth of new products. This paper addresses this gap in the context of new pharmaceuticals (15 new molecules in 34 countries) and sheds light on the effects of regulatory regimes on new drug sales across the globe. Based on a time-varying coefficient model, we find that differences in regulation substantially contribute to cross-country variation in sales. One of the regulatory constraints investigated, i.e., manufacturer price controls, has a positive effect on drug sales. The other forms of regulation such as restrictions of physician prescription budgets and the prohibition of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) tend to hurt sales. The effect of manufacturer price controls is similar for newly launched and mature drugs. By contrast, regulations on physician prescription budgets and DTCA have a differential effect for newly launched and mature drugs. Whereas the former hurts mature drugs more, the latter has a larger effect on newly launched drugs. In addition to these regulatory effects, we find that national culture, economic wealth, and lagged sales also affect drug sales. Our findings may be used as input by managers for international launch and marketing decisions. They may also be used by public policy administrators to assess the role of regulatory regimes in pharmaceutical sales growth.

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions.

With increasing fragmentation of media markets and recent advances in technology, loss of advertising effectiveness has been a great concern for marketers. For consumers, the digital video recorder (DVR) offers the possibility to fast-forward through live programming. Whereas the DVR thus benefits consumers by reducing nuisance from commercials, industry observers believe that it may diminish advertisers' profits by rendering commercials ineffective. We use a model of informative advertising to study the effect of DVR penetration on competing advertisers' strategies and profits. We find that the overall effect of DVRs depends on the trade off between loss of advertising effectiveness and reduction in competition between firms. The latter effect arises because DVR penetration may increase the ratio of partially informed to fully informed consumers. We identify conditions under which an increase in DVR penetration counterintuitively leads firms to increase advertising levels and enjoy higher profits. Interestingly, we find that greater DVR penetration is beneficial for firms when the share of DVR owners in the population is above—rather than below—a threshold level. We also study the impact of different fast-forwarding (“zipping”) behaviors on product market competition.

Price promotions and bundling have been two of the most widely used marketing tools in industry practice. Past literature has assumed that firms respond to price promotions by promoting a product in the same category. In this paper, we extend this literature as well as the bundling literature by considering the possibility that a firm may respond to a competitor's price promotions by also offering a cross-buying or bundling discount. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that bundle discounts can help increase profits in a competitive market by creating endogenous loyalty, thereby reducing the intensity of promotional competition. We also find that bundle discounts can be used as an effective defensive marketing tool to prevent customer defection to the competition.

We introduce and test a behavioral model of consumer product search that extends a baseline normative model of sequential search by incorporating nonnormative influences that are local in the sense that they reflect consumers' undue sensitivity to recently encountered alternatives. We propose two types of such local behavioral influences that, at each stage of a search process, can manifest themselves both in which of the products inspected up to that point is deemed to be the most preferred one (the product comparison decision) and whether to terminate the search at that stage (the stopping decision). The first of these influences is that consumers respond excessively to the attractiveness of the currently inspected product, at the expense of all others (“focalism”). The second proposed behavioral influence is that consumers overreact to the difference in attractiveness between the current product and the one encountered just prior to it (“local contrast”). Converging evidence from two experiments, which combine to guarantee both high internal and high external validity, provides support for the proposed behavioral influences. Our findings demonstrate that consumers' product comparison and stopping decisions in sequential product search are jointly governed by normative principles and by the proposed local behavioral influences.

Critics often decry an earnings-focused short-term orientation of management that eschews spending on risky, long-term projects such as innovation to boost a firm's stock price. Such critics assume that stock markets react positively to announcements of immediate earnings but negatively to announcements of investments in innovation that have an uncertain long-term pay off. Contrary to this position, we argue that the market's true appreciation of innovation can be estimated by assessing the total market returns to the entire innovation project. We demonstrate this approach via the Fama-French 3-factor model (including Carhart's momentum factor) on 5,481 announcements from 69 firms in five markets and 19 technologies between 1977 and 2006. The total market returns to an innovation project are $643 million, more than 13 times the $49 million from an average innovation event. Returns to negative events are higher in absolute value than those to positive events. Returns to initiation occur 4.7 years ahead of launch. Returns to development activities are the highest and those to commercialization the lowest of all activities. Returns to new product launch are the lowest among all eight events tracked. Returns are higher for smaller firms than larger firms. Returns to the announcing firm are substantially greater than those to competitors across all stages. We discuss the implications of these results.